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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This research implicates gender in the study of sexuality and suggests a 
genealogy of transgender that consists of both the medicalisation of transsexuality 
and the articulation of gender performances in gay liberation’s politics of 
difference.   While the transgender subject is often idealised in queer discourses, 
this research positions the transsexual (one articulation of transgender) as 
normative: conservative gender politics, the ontological separation of gender and 
sexuality that echoes assimilationist gay and lesbian politics, an identity based on 
essentialist biology and psychiatric “wrong body” discourses, and the privileging 
of passing technologies such as hormone replacement therapies and sex 
reassignment surgery (themselves justified though the elaboration of wrong body 
discourses).   
 
 Further to this, the public rendering of some transgender bodies as 
nonconformist results in violence and the need to explore alternate spaces of being, 
namely the internet which has the potential to build community, raise 
consciousness of gender and transgender oppression, but can also be used to 
legitimate transnormative (re)productions of the self. 
 
 The analysis of two online communities of transgender individuals shows 
the most frequent users tended to be transsexual and privileging conservative 
gender politics and an essentialist medical etiology of transsexuality.  Users were 
ii 
also typically more knowledgeable in passing biotechnologies than some medical 
professionals.  In one community that are tailored to transgender individuals, 
subjects felt at ease to discuss a variety of topics and explore the complications of 
transgender.  In the second community, tailored towards feminists in general, 
transgender issues were addressed in a more confrontational manner, often 
exposing the transphobic nature of some feminisms.   
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1  
AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
For heterosexuals allowed homosexuals enormous social leeway for 
their excesses, so long as they agreed not to disturb the general peace of 
society at large. 
-Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normal: 
An Argument about Homosexuality 
(1995) 
 
 
 
This thesis is a visible, psychical, and academic sign of my own sexuality 
and degrees of gender play. Not only have I had to come to terms with my 
sexuality for my own sense of self, I have also had to come to terms with how my 
masculinity is perceived because of it as well as having my sexuality presumed by 
my gender performance(s).  Queer politics have provided me with an insistence 
that I can (re)invent my sexuality and gender on my terms.  I include gender within 
my ontology of sexuality because gender nonconformity is often inferred as 
homosexuality and sexuality variances can have quite colourful and playful 
performances of gender without typically being termed “transgender,” complicating 
the very notion of transgender and its relation to the gay and lesbian communities. 
 
Transgender is an umbrella term to describe a variety of gender 
subversions, including, but not limited to, transvestism, transsexuality, drag, 
androgyny, and even intersexuality.  Types of transgender subjectivities and 
performances are often delineated by their nature: transvestism is typically 
associated with fetishism, drag with the playful exaggeration of gender roles, and 
transsexuality with being “in the wrong body” and a desire to live long term as the 
gender that is not congruent to their sexed body.  To complicate matters even more, 
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for example, most transsexuals may choose genital reassignment surgery, whilst 
others may prefer to keep the genitals with which they were born.  I use 
transgender in its broadest form, to incorporate any form(s) of gender subversion, 
as I believe the word’s socio-political potential is to act to delimit any 
categorisation. 
  
An online transgender community may help to frame debates and discourses 
to help challenge cultural assumptions about gender and gender variance, 
especially as they relate to and intersect with sexualities.  As a means of promoting 
a dialogue with the public, the internet is one of the cheapest and far-reaching ways 
ideas can reach the public (Grauerholz and Baker-Sperry, 2007).  Since there are 
virtually no controls over what can be published on the internet, it can be a place 
where marginalised voices and personal narratives can be heard. Once online and 
available globally, websites in the public domain have the potential to engage or 
enrage the public.  And if feminist and queer projects are intertwined with a sense 
of social movement activity, they are already public.  Transwebs, what I term 
websites designed by and targeted to transgender people, including informational 
resources, message boards, social interactions, etc, can be an effective medium to 
challenge cultural (mis)conceptions about gender, by providing critical and 
ontological alternatives to gender.   
 
Employing poststructuralist perspectives, and in particular the analytical 
instruments of social constructionism, this research seeks to explore the following 
questions: 
1. How did the category transgender come into meaning and how does it act to 
name and (re)produce its own subjects? 
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2. Are certain transgender subjectivities and ontologies privileged and does that 
produce a sort of transnormativity? 
3. How might an online resource be constituted by and constitutive of that which 
is transgender?  
 
Further to this, this project will  
 
1. document recurring themes in the communities and analyse the constructive 
discourses of community members and their dissemination of advice, 
information, and self-exploration/subjectivity formation;  
2. explore the problematics in the diversity of the umbrella term “transgender”;  
3. assess the theoretical “queerness” of transgender subjects varying from more 
normative (and unqueer?) transsexual subjectivities that are arguably framed 
by medical and “wrong body” discourses, and; 
4. assess the ways in which the use of virtual space can have real effects in 
material space through consciousness-raising and cyberactivism. 
 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 The remainder of Chapter One will discuss introduce main themes upon 
which this thesis is based, including gender transgression in the cultural 
mainstream, from television to the internet, noting the public discomfort caused by 
gender variance.  It also positions gender as both implicated in the genealogy of 
contemporary homosexuality and rights claims and within the proliferation of queer 
theories.  It also provides a rationale for the use of an online internet community 
for the purposes of this project.   
 
My own feminism is defined by my queerness as much as my queerness is 
defined by my feminism.  As a queer man, I feel a sort of kinship with feminism.  I 
will often discuss both feminist and queer theory in tandem; feminists and queers 
make not-so-strange bedfellows.  Quoting comedian Margaret Cho, cultural theorist 
Deborah Thompson describes this relationship in her text on fag hags: 
The marriage of two derogatory terms, fag and hag, symbolising the union 
of the world’s most popular objects of scorn, homosexual and woman, 
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creates a moniker that most of those who wear it find inoffensive, possibly 
because it smacks of solidarity. (2004: 42) 
 
For me, homophobia and transphobia are misogyny by another name.  To a man we 
might say, “You should be ashamed of being like a woman,” because there is 
something troubling or offensive about being a woman.  It is in this way Cho 
recognises the (male) homosexual and woman as objects of scorn and as joint 
potential for coalition.  This is but an aspect of my feminism, of my queerness.  
(However, the relationship between gay men and women itself may not be as 
comfortable as it seems.  My own experience is one of finding most gay men are 
repulsed by the mention of the female body, especially female genitals.  Feminist 
Sheila Jeffreys (2005) refers to this as the “ick factor.”)   
 
 To say that I identify with women is not, of course, to say I identify as a 
woman, which decades ago probably might have been my psychiatric diagnosis.  
Chapter Two deals with the history of medical discourse as it pertains to gender 
deviance, transsexualism, and gender performances’ punitive consequences.   It is 
no surprise, then, that “straight-acting” (masculine) gay men are less likely to be 
victims of abuse as effeminate men – gay or straight.  It is in this way that gender 
transgression is (often violently) policed, both externally (by others) or internally 
(by oneself).  This chapter also locates this research within wider epistemological 
debates about the status of knowledge(s) produced by feminist poststructuralist 
research.  Because gender performances and the corporeality of the body are 
publicly read, individuals who disturb gender-normative expectations are often 
denied access to public space or excluded from public discourse through their 
visual transgression of gender, something that will be elaborated on.  Gender 
pioneers, I will argue, can seek out new spaces in the form of the internet.  
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However, can virtual spaces and transgender “virtual communities/citizens” 
subvert and overturn their marginality from both the (hetero)normative and queer 
communities and how might this be accomplished?  Is virtual space a way to do 
this?   
 
Chapter Three positions this research in queer geographical frameworks and 
the critique of the knowledge factory of positivist social sciences.  It provides a 
detailed description of the design and process of this research project.  Within this 
chapter, I articulate my own positionality within this research and how I have come 
to position my research within a queer epistemology, first considered by 
geographer Jon Binnie (1997), as well as discussing some works in oral history and 
biography as knowledge claim-making.   
 
Chapter Four discusses some trends in one online transgender community as 
articulated through personal transgender narratives, including linguistic 
resignification, the polarisation of the radical queer academy,   medical practices 
and essentialising constructions of transsexuality, and passing.  It also notes that 
the dissemination of mainstream news is a possibility for consciousness-raising.   
Another, distinctly different online community is discussed in Chapter 5 and 
describes the difficulties in creating a transgender community on a feminist site. 
 
Chapter Six concludes the thesis with a discussion of trends discovered 
within the online community.  While the limits of this research are described, 
suggestions for elaboration and future researches are discussed. 
 
 6 
Gender Nonconformity and the Cultural Mainstream 
But why the internet?  Online communication allows for a global network 
of interaction and the distribution of knowledge claims.  Digg.com is a social news 
website designed to allow people from all around the globe to discover and submit 
content from anywhere on the Internet.  One submission was the news story 
“Matrix director Larry Wachowski now walks as a woman in LA,” which received 
1243 diggs, making it one of the most popular stories of the day it was released and 
allowed a link to it to remain on the homepage throughout the day (Digg, 2009).  
The story about the action film (read: expectedly hypermasculine) director 
beginning to live his life as a woman also received 246 comments, which ranged 
from offensive (“gay man is gay”) to supportive (“Good for her. If that's who Larry 
really is, who is anyone to judge? And if you judge him, WHY?”) to downright 
sophomoric (“are we sure that's a guy? because i'd hit it!”). 
 
I find it difficult to completely detach sexuality and gender, as they are 
often conflated in the public imaginary and queering gender is often interpreted as 
homosexuality, as the above example indicates – the comment “gay man is gay” 
suggests the male-bodied Larry Wachowski is merely deluded and is just a gay man 
masquerading as a (presumed heterosexual) woman.  Indeed, it is the effeminate 
fag and masculine dyke that make legible the confluence of gender “disturbance” 
and sexuality.  But it is this very excess of gender that exposes gender’s own 
constructedness.  It is difficult to discuss transgender bodies without historically 
placing them within the queer community, as transgender is often conflated with 
homosexuality and a history of gay politics that has at times celebrated (and at 
times reviled) the ambiguous, gender-transgressive body.  For this reason we have 
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the notion of the LGBT community, a (rather loose) coalition combining gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender subjects. 
 
Poststructuralist perspectives and the analytical tools of social 
constructionism provide an opportunity for feminists and queers to challenge 
contemporary certainties that define and shape bodies and practices.  Individuals 
are understood as constituted from the meanings produced by discourse; 
individuals may be so-called agents making their own seemingly autonomous 
choices regarding the expression(s) of their gender and the negotiation of their 
gender identity, but they do so within a complex matrix of socially constructed 
meanings that may constrain – or make impossible – some choices. Geographer 
Gillian Rose (1993: 13) states, “If masculinity is itself fluid and diverse, and 
intersects with class, race and sexuality in complex and unstable ways, one form of 
feminism cannot be adequate to the task of resistance.”  This is, I believe, an 
avenue wherein queer theories might aid feminism.  For queer theorist Judith 
Halberstam (2005: 5), “in queer renderings of postmodern geography, the notion of 
a body-centred identity gives way to a model that locates sexual subjectivities 
within and between embodiment, place, and practice.”  Judith Butler (1990) herself 
warns that feminism should be mindful of not idealising or privileging certain 
bodies or expressions of gender, for example essentialist notions of women as 
woman-born and subsequently erasing other identities of “woman.” Queer theories 
are critical sites where contemporary contemplations and contestations of gender 
and sexuality exist. 
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Of course, I have my reservations around the theorising of the political 
versus establishing a queer politics.  While postmodernism is “simultaneously a 
crisis and an opportunity” (Halberstam 2005: 6), postmodernism has often been 
criticised for creating an apolitical politics.  While the relationship between theory 
and praxis is already troubled, English scholar Frederick Roden (2001) suggests it 
is especially strained in liberation politics; that essentialism debates and 
postmodern theoretical arguments on fluidity may not – and often cannot – 
translate into real political action.  The academy, as well as my many years of 
education that has culminated in this thesis, is privileged and I could not write 
about gender performance and social construction without being in a certain 
position in terms of education and learning, despite the fact that many political 
actors may not have the same access to education and theory that I may have had.  
The goal, then, is to try to exist within the academy and make the apolitical 
political once again, to write to satisfy the academy as well as activists, to link 
theory and praxis. For example, transphobia cannot be ignored by the academy so 
subjects’ transgressive bodies can be theorised and discussed, used and discarded, 
dissected and analysed in absence of the very real conditions faced by gender 
variant individuals that constitute their very subjectivity and experiences, whether 
negative or positive. 
 
Personal gender performance inevitably leads to public gender assessment 
and transgendered individuals are often invisible in Western cultures because of a 
presumed binary classification of gender – or, more accurately, assignment to one 
of only two existing categories.  Sociologist Emily W. Kane (2006) found that 
heterosexual fathers engage in more differential treatment of sons and daughters 
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and enforce gender boundaries more than mothers, who appear to maintain gender 
boundaries more towards sons than daughters, both parents conflating male gender 
variance and homosexuality.  She suggests that the subordination of nonhegemonic 
masculinities occurs from birth.  Not surprisingly, hegemonic masculinity is 
heterosexual, with contempt for homosexuality, gender variance, and other 
suggestions of “failed masculinity.”  Again, we see the conflation and fear of 
gender deviation as an indicator of sexual deviation.  Because transgendered 
individuals violate conventional notions of gender they become targeted for 
discrimination and abuse, with transwomen, individuals born male but identify and 
express as female, at particular risk of violence. Indeed, psychologists Arnold 
Grossman and Anthony D’Augelli (2006) found that the most important concern of 
transgendered youths was personal safety and the fear of violence. 
 
 Gay liberation played an enormous role in effectively immobilising gays 
and lesbians following the police raid on the Stonewall Inn in 1969, which defined 
the starting point of the gay rights movements and confronted the early homophile 
philosophy of assimilation. The Stonewall Inn catered to some of the most 
marginalised of gay men: transvestites, drag queens, the effeminate, and hustlers.  
In the early hours of 28 June 1969 New York City the police raided the institution 
with the intention to arrest any men dressed as women.  The raid did not go as 
planned and ultimately sparked the modern gay liberation movement.  Simple 
assimilation was no longer the goal as gay liberationists focused on gay pride, the 
rejection of homosexuality as a psychiatric condition, and the hetero/homo 
dichotomy.  However, it was more than a movement to liberate sexuality.  Gay 
liberation demonstrated that the hetero/homo dichotomy implicates the 
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masculine/feminine binary of sex roles that views masculine and feminine as 
mutually exclusive. 
 
 The gay liberation and lesbian feminist movements placed a particular 
emphasis on community and a unified gay/lesbian identity-based politics.  Gay 
liberation and lesbian feminism saw their projects as a release from hetero/homo 
and masculine/feminine roles.  By the mid-1970s, however, people of colour – 
particularly lesbians of colour – began to recognise their interests were not always 
adequately represented and their experiences often overlooked and began to 
critique the movements’ bias towards the white and middle-class, questioning 
whether gay liberation is a project of identity-based exploitation.  Constructionist 
scholars and the immergence of poststructuralism provided a way to deconstruct 
the category of the gay/lesbian subject and recognise a dissenting voice and as such 
poststructuralism inspired a revolt by the gay/lesbian periphery against the 
gay/lesbian centre.  The notion of a unified gay/lesbian identity-based politics was 
now in dispute: individuals no longer have a core gay/lesbian essence that race and 
class only subtly affect.  Individuals are simultaneously gay/lesbian, 
white/black/Hispanic/indigenous, and middle/working class, each shaped by and 
shaping the others.  For example, Butler (1990) argues that feminism represents the 
limits of identity politics and the category of women by failing to recognise its own 
constitutive power of claims to identity.   The feminist articulation of a stable, 
gendered subject is thus problematised as the foundational premise of a feminism 
that relies on a binary gender/sex discourse. Indeed, for Butler the category of 
women is “normative and exclusionary and is invoked with the unmarked 
dimensions of class and racial privilege intact” (ibid.: 19). 
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 By the 1980s, marginalised sexual and gender minorities, such as bisexuals 
and S/M practitioners, stood out against the dominant couple-dominated intimate 
norm.  S/M in particular was a threat to the socially conservative gay mainstream 
since it challenged the privileging of gender preference in defining sexual identity, 
as men who may have sex with men exclusively defined their sexual identity in 
relation to their S/M practices instead (Seidman, 1993).  Embarrassed by certain 
members, the mainstream gay community became more conservative and moved 
back toward a politics of assimilation and normalcy.  
 
 I suggest that today queer culture is centred on social difference and the 
multiplicity of identities.  In poststructuralist terms, appealing to one’s sexual, 
gender, or ethnic identity as the grounds for community-building is particularly 
problematic because of those categories’ instabilities and exclusions.  While gay 
liberation framed homosexuality as an issue of sexual politics, poststructuralists 
frame the hetero/homo dichotomy in Western culture as political itself.  Sociologist 
Steven Seidman (ibid.) argues that the notion of queer unites the heterogenous 
interests and desires marginalised by gay liberation.  For him “queers are not united 
by any unitary identity but only by their opposition to disciplining, normalising 
social forces,” maintained by the gay/lesbian centre (ibid.: 133). 
 
The Death (and Reincarnation) of Queer? 
With the defining queer texts Epistemology of the Closet and Gender 
Trouble now two decades old, some argue that which is known as Queer Theory 
has exhausted itself.  Has the flirtation with queer become a bored marriage, 
 12 
staying together for the sake of the children (i.e., young scholars)?  A recent issue 
of South Atlantic Quarterly was devoted to the question “What’s so queer about 
queer studies now?”  In it, Law and English scholars Janet Halley and Andrew 
Parker reflect on the fact that 
[T]he authors around whom queer theory crystallized seem to have spent 
the past decade distancing themselves from their previous work: in recent 
years, for example, Judith Butler has been writing about justice and human 
rights, Michael Warner about sermons and secularism, and Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick about Melanie Klein and Buddhism. (Halley and Parker, 2007: 
421-422). 
 
The journal notes, however, its own scarcity of work in non-Anglophone 
literatures, which may be a reflection of queer studies, itself.  While it 
problematised certainties of identity and state sanctioned monogamous 
heterosexuality with its persistence of critique, critics of queer theories have noted 
that Western queer subjectivities – particularly American queer subjectivities – 
assume innocence of their own “colonising fantasies” (Hoad, 2007: 516). 
 
English scholar Neville Hoad suggests the era of Queer Theory is on the 
wane.  When anyone – even heterosexuals – can be queered, has the queer 
theoretical project imploded upon itself and been exhausted to a sort of post-
queerness?  Or perhaps “queer theory” did not even exist.  Feminism itself may 
have been a sort of queer knowledge project.  After all, feminism has long been 
concerned with the (dis)articulation of gender and sexuality.  Perhaps Queer 
Theory was an en vogue feminism, a brand new feminism marketed to sexual 
dissidents and gender outlaws. 
 
 Another critique of Queer Theory is that since its inquiry originated from 
sexuality, it must deal exclusively with sexuality.  However, there is research that 
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is broadening the scope of queerness, such as feminist geographer Robyn 
Longhurst’s (2008) discussion of adult nursing, interspecies breastfeeding, and men 
who breastfeed, all phenomena she refers to as queer breastfeeding, not to mention 
research conducted on gender, class, religion, and race, all of which potentially 
intersect with sexuality. 
  
While some research on online communication technologies has been 
focused on gender differences, media scholar Irmi Karl (2007: 48) challenges queer 
theories to pay attention to “what kinds of gender identities are being forged in the 
process and how… sexual identities intersect with gender identities through an 
engagement with the technological.” Cyberqueer subjects are produced through a 
historical production of utopias, with the intersection of cyber and queer as the 
“intersection of two promissory discourses, which unfold through utopian thinking 
about technological futures” (O’Riordan, 2007: 17).  However, there is also 
evidence to suggest that online queer communities have fixed identity hierarchies 
(ibid.: 26).  Given that transgender has emerged as a collective term for all gender 
variance – arguably heteronormative transsexuals, radical genderfuckers, 
sexualised transvestites, etc – can online communities (re)produce a hierarchy 
within this category of being, failing the idealism of the cyberqueer project? 
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2  
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
 
Within the boundaries of our present scientific knowledge, the gender 
disordered patient presents to the physician as a physically, 
endocrinologically and genetically normal individual. 
  -Herbert Bower, MD (2001)  
 
 
Poststructuralism is a set of theories regarding the relationship between 
language, subjectivity, social organisation, and power, as well as an analysis of the 
mechanism by which people adopt particular discursive positions (Weedon, 1987).  
Poststructuralism does not have one fixed meaning, but refers to the works of many 
thinkers, including Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault.  While early, prominent 
poststructuralists tended to be (heterosexual and cisgender1) men, the theorists who 
have produced much of the early poststructuralist texts had an unsympathetic 
attitude towards feminism and gay politics; however this has not kept feminists and 
queer theorists from engaging these texts.  For example, Foucault’s theory of 
discourse and power was appropriated by poststructuralist feminists analysing 
patriarchal power relations.   
 
Poststructuralism developed out of the limits of humanist approaches to the 
social sciences. The humanist self is an autonomous agent and this notion of the 
self presumes a continuous, coherent identity; people make autonomous, rational 
decisions and exist separate from the external world. Poststructuralism rejected this 
notion of an all knowing rational self that had varying degrees of power to control 
                                                 
1 Cisgender is identifying one’s social gender as congruent to one’s biological gender assignment, i.e., 
not trans. From the Latin prefix meaning on the same side as. 
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its own life trajectory.  For poststructuralists, the construction of the self is a kind 
of activity and the discursive I is produced through language. Language no longer 
describes a person’s life, but produces it and locates it in a framework of social and 
historical discourses. Subjectivity is socially produced in a wide range of discursive 
practices, including economic, racial, social, political, and sexual influences.  It is a 
geography of embodiment wherein the body is a site of knowledge production and 
an effect of discursive practices, as “the individual is always the site of conflicting 
forms of subjectivity” (Weedon, 1987: 33).  Most importantly, poststructuralism 
calls into question such analytical categories such as gender and sexuality. 
 
Poststructuralism allows for the understanding of existing power relations 
and to identify methods of resistance and strategies for change.   Discourses can be 
thought of as patterns of speech, concepts, values, and statements from ontological 
ways of giving meaning to both the physical and social worlds that construct what 
we think of as real.  Discourses are ways of constituting knowledge and the power 
relations that form within these knowledges.  They do not exist in seclusion, but 
rather as part of a larger discursive matrix.  They can be thought of as productive, 
as they are ways of making sense of the experienced world.  Individual discourses 
operate in a discursive field wherein not all discourses carry equal weight; some 
account for or will justify the status quo.  (For example, gender may exist in the 
discursive practises of sexuality, medicine, and public space.)  As such, discourses 
can also be traced historically; indeed, Foucault’s theory of discourse insists upon 
historical specificity.   A poststructuralist approach attempts to understand how 
normalising truths are produced, for whom, and for what purposes.  In order to 
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have a social effect, a discourse must at least be in circulation (Weedon, 1987).  
Analysing discourse bridges social, cultural and historic levels of analysis. 
 
 The effects – or sets/matrices – of discourse(s) are naturalised as the way 
we think within a particular context.  For example, we can assume there is a set of 
discourses that shape what we think of as masculine and feminine and this is reified 
by, for example, the fact that there are different attributes that define the parameters 
of the gendered, corporeal subject, thus the masculine-feminine binary is produced 
through discourse.  Knowledge and power is a discursive practice of truth-
formation that stabilises and naturalises gender(/sex); our understandings of the 
“truth” of gender seems natural and based on biological difference.  In the analysis 
of discourse, it is not the interest of which discourse is true - or the representation 
of the real – it is the social mechanics by which a discourse is (re)produced as the 
dominant discourse, or a metanarrative of truth, that shapes our subjectivities.  One 
of the major effects of discourse/knowledge/power is the construction of 
subjectivity.  This sort of subjectivity calls into question the all-knowing humanist 
self by suggesting agency and choices are subject to the very discourses that shape 
choices and question what the self may or may not be aware of based on their 
location within a sociopolitical discourse.  In other words, within a poststructuralist 
epistemology choice is not free, but is constrained and constituted within a 
subject's sociopolitical positioning. 
 
Political scientist and commentator Andrew Sullivan argues that the “sheer 
radicalism of the Foucauldean agenda mandates an apolitical politics” (1995: 88), 
an impossible revolution of sociopolitics that reduces people to discursive puppets.  
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This is something that gender activist Riki Anne Wilchins (2004: 1) is aware of: 
“as queer theory retreated further into academic arcana, it became of increasingly 
less use to the people who needed it.” However, while discourses may seem all 
powerful and resistance is futile, within discourses there are still possibilities for 
resistance.  In The History of Sexuality, Foucault offers one such possibility: 
There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, 
jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species 
and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, and ‘psychic 
hermaphrodism’ made a strong advance of social controls into this area of 
‘perversity’; but also made possible the formation of a ‘reverse’ discourse: 
homosexuality began to speak on its own behalf, to demand that its 
legitimacy or ‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, 
using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified. 
(Foucault, 1978: 101) 
 
This reverse discourse has important implications in the resistance of dominant 
discourses it seeks to subvert:  It allows for the development of new, resisting 
discourses.  If gender and sexuality are produced to feel natural and not the effect 
of diffuse power relations, then reverse discourses allows gender nonconformists to 
resist and form new discourses of resistance.  Reverse discourse allows for the 
production of resistance and new discourses to be developed. In the 1999 edition of 
Gender Trouble, Butler (1990) addresses some of the criticisms concerning her 
theory of agency.  She states, “The iterability of performativity is a theory of 
agency, one that cannot disavow power as the condition of its own possibility” 
(ibid.: xxv).  Indeed, even in Gender Trouble, Butler assures the reader that to be 
constituted by discourse is not to be determined by discourse, thus foreclosing any 
possibility of agency.  Instead, agency is deployed through how signification and 
resignification work; agency is “located within the possibility of a variation on that 
repetition” of gender (ibid.: 198).  
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For Foucault, power/knowledge aimed to produce a discourse “which had to 
model itself after that which spoke, not of sin and salvation, but of bodies and life 
processes – the discourse of science” (1978: 64). This can be thought of having 
been achieved achieved through the medicalisation of the effects of confession 
from the priest to the psychiatrist, which re-encode the notion of non-normative 
expression of sexuality/gender as pathological/medical, from the confession of sin 
to the confession of psychical abnormality.  As an extension of this, what Foucault 
terms “bio-power” works through the technologies of power operating on both the 
individual and the social body, because “power is situated and exercised at the 
level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” 
through a series of regulatory controls, guaranteeing the effects of hegemony (ibid.: 
137).  One effect of bio-power is surveillance and pathologisation of deviant 
bodies, disciplining the body and regulating populations.  Policing gender and 
privileging “proper” expressions of gender secures heterosexuality in a way that 
makes a binary materiality of sex seem natural and taken for granted. 
 
 I will begin this chapter by discussing the ways gender “deviant” bodies 
have been constructed, engaging specifically anthropologist David Valentine’s 
Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category.  Next I will discuss the 
progression of (trans)gender/sexual theory and ways in which reverse discourses 
may be formed.  I will historically place the contemporary New Zealand/Aotearoa 
transgendered subject through a discussion of the Human Rights Commission’s 
2007 report, To Be Who I Am: Report of the Inquiry into Discrimination Experienced by 
Transgender People. This report reviews the first inquiry regarding transgendered 
individuals by any country’s Human Rights Commission (HRC).  While this 
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research is not concerned with New Zealand/Aotearoa specifically, the HRC’s 
report can be used as an allegory of Western transgender subjectivities. Finally, I 
will then analyse the report’s findings through the theory of sexual citizenship and 
access to public and imaginative/virtual space, informed by essays in Kate 
O’Riordan and David J Phillips’ Queer Online: Media, Technology, & Sexuality, a 
collection of current research that focuses on queer theory and practices that 
intersect with online communication technologies. 
 
Becoming Transgender 
 Since the early 1980s, when the influential anthropologist Gayle Rubin first 
suggested that feminism should not be the site of sexual theory and that sexuality 
should be considered a field of inquiry of its own, scholars have sought to discuss 
the ways in which gender and sexuality – further burdened by issues of race, class, 
and colonialism – have come to intersect (Valentine and Wilchins, 1997). David 
Valentine (2007), in his text Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a 
Category, concerns himself with a genealogy of transgender, a possible site of 
intersection. Transgender as a term came into prominence in the early 1990s as a 
collective term for any and all gender variance, refusing “the stability the term 
‘transsexual’ may offer to some folks and embrac[ing] more hybrid possibilities for 
embodiment and identification” (Halberstam, 2001: 20).  However, the notion of 
gender variance has a much longer history largely positions within sexuality.  The 
early pathology of homosexuality was also constructed through visible evidence of 
non-normative gender expression, which caused early sexologists to construct 
(male) homosexuals as a third sex. While Valentine spends little time describing 
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early theories in sexology, I believe this sociomedical model deserves a more 
thorough discussion.   
 
 The human sciences, such as psychiatry and medicine, have played 
important roles in shaping the way individuals think about bodies, identity, and 
social practices.  Clinical thought refined its methods and scientific norms to 
produce “a pure Gaze that would be pure Language: a speaking eye” that would 
turn into  
speech that states and teaches; the truth, which events, in their repetitions 
and convergence, would outline under its gaze, would, by this same gaze in 
the same order, be reserved, in the form of teaching, to those who do not 
know and have not seen.  This speaking eye would be servant of things and 
the master of truth. (Foucault, 1973: 114-115).   
 
Foucault is discussing here the dissemination of medical knowledges throughout 
early health practitioners, though the same process is still in place today.  Foucault 
points out that “the medical gaze circulates within an enclosed space in which it is 
controlled only by itself; in sovereign fashion, it distributes to daily experience and 
knowledge that it has borrowed from afar… In that experience, medical space can 
coincide with social space, or, rather, traverse it and wholly penetrate it” (ibid.: 31).  
We see here the privileged role medical knowledges hold in shaping not just how 
we think about our bodies, but how these knowledges shape discourses that 
produce the terms of larger social relations.  In fact, 
medicine must no longer be confined to a body of techniques for curing 
ills and of the knowledge that they require; it will also embrace a 
knowledge of healthy man, that is, a study of non-sick man and a 
definition of model man.  In the ordering of human existence it assumes a 
normative posture, which authorizes it not only to distribute advice as to 
healthy life, but also to dictate the standards for physical and moral 
relations of the individual and of the society in which he lives.” (ibid.: 35)  
 
Here we see an early formation of Foucault’s notion of biopower and how it may 
operate.  Medical knowledges seek to maintain a physically and psychically 
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normative (nonpathogenic) individual that dictates physical and moral standards for 
society.  Medical bipolarity develops in such a way that normal and pathological 
are mutually exclusive.  It is in this way medical knowledge (re)produces the 
heteropatriarchal nation-state that presumes heterosexual, normatively gendered 
citizens. 
 
Medical sociologist David Armstrong suggests a postclinical direction in 
medicine called surveillance medicine, which involves a spatial reorganisation of 
the framework of illness and the inclusion of extracorporeal space.  What is 
striking in its difference to hospital medicine is its negation of healthy as an 
inclusionary tactic; surveillance medicine presumes everyone is ill, or at least in a 
constant state of risk.  It made itself the dominant medical paradigm by suggesting 
that if everyone had a pathology, everyone would need to be monitored.   
Surveillance medicine requires the dissolution of the distinct clinical 
categories of healthy and ill as it attempts to bring everyone within its 
network of visibility.  Therefore one of the earliest expressions of 
surveillance medicine – and a vital precondition of its continuing 
proliferation – was the problematisation of the normal. (Armstrong, 1995: 
395) 
 
In the discourse of surveillance medicine, health is a precarious, vulnerable state.  
Armstrong’s basic example of the power of surveillance medicine is that of the 
child, the first target of this form of power.  The child is under a constant state of 
growth and development and the risk of medical deviance can occur at any time 
during this development, leading to the establishment of postnatal care, baby 
clinics or plunkets, and nursery schools, which ensured the healthy early 
development of a child.  Surveillance medicine concerned itself not just with the 
development of the body, but the development of a healthy mind.  Informed by the 
works of Freud and psychoanalytic theory, it is at this point the medical gaze 
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turned its focus to the vulnerable, unformed mind of the child, to monitor 
psychological wellbeing as well as classify any abnormal behaviours, thus creating 
the shy child, the oversensitive child, and, of course, the gender/sexually-confused 
child (which is at risk of developing into an adult homosexual).  Another important 
feature of surveillance medicine is its reconfiguration of extracorporeal space.  
With a new importance based on risk factors, surveillance medicine turns to the 
material and social spaces of individuals to identify the precursors of inevitable 
illness.  If one person is vulnerable to something in their environment, then all 
bodies may be vulnerable to that same thing, leading to an epidemic. 
 
For psychiatrist and sexologist Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1882), in 
Psychopathia Sexualis, an early medico-forensic text on sexual perversion, the 
etiology of sexual perversion can be attributed to masturbation, which “despoils the 
unfolding bud of perfume and beauty, and leaves behind only the coarse, animal 
desire of sexual satisfaction” that depraves the patient from wanting “that aesthetic, 
ideal, pure and free impulse which draws the opposite sexes together” (ibid.: 189).  
The patient then degenerates into “a process of physical and mental 
transformation” (ibid.: 190). 
 
Krafft-Ebing identifies four degrees of sexual inversion: The first is the 
simple reversal of sexual feeling, where a person is attracted to a member of the 
same sex while also being able to be attracted to members of the opposite sex; the 
second degree is eviration (feminisation of males) and defemination 
(masculinisation of females); the third degree is the transition to change of sex 
delusion, in which personal sensation is transformed to the opposite sex; the fourth 
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degree is metamorphisis sexualis paranoica, the delusion of sexual change and the 
total inversion of sex.  English scholar Jay Prosser (1998) recategorises these 
degrees as bisexuality, homosexuality, transsexuality, and intersexuality.  Krafft-
Ebing’s case of the Hungarian doctor is an example of what we would now 
consider to be transsexuality (in contemporary terms) and what would later be 
called gender identity disorder.  He tells the doctor: 
I feel like a woman in a man’s form; and even though I am sensible of the 
man’s form, yet it is always in the feminine sense.  Thus, for example, I 
feel the penis as clitoris; the urethra and vaginal orifice, which always feels 
a little wet, even when it is actually dry; the scrotum as labia majora; in 
short, I always feel the vulva.  And all that that means one alone can know 
who feels or has felt so.  But the skin all over me feels feminine; it receives 
all impressions, whether of touch, or warmth, or whether unfriendly, as 
feminine, and I have the sensations of a woman. (Krafft-Ebing, 1982: 207) 
 
For Krafft-Ebing, the doctor’s feeling were a psychical anomaly, with the 
sensations of a sexual change now dominating his consciousness.  Prosser asserts 
that sexual inversion was what we would now call transgender and that the 
category is a much more broad gender-inverted condition that also included 
homosexuals. 
 
Sex reassignment is considered by some health professionals to be the most 
effective treatment for gender identity disorder (Bower, 2001).  According to 
psychiatrist Herbert Bower there are two components essential for the diagnosis of 
gender identity disorder: cross-gender identification and discomfort in regards to 
one’s assigned sex.  Bower notes that the majority of male-to-female transsexuals 
are attracted to males and desire heterosexual male partners, thus medical science 
reinforcing heterosexuality as part of the treatment for gender identity disorder 
through sex reassignment surgery.  (Interestingly, Bower describes the drag queen 
as having “aggressive and histrionic behaviour which is often accompanied by drug 
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dependency and soliciting” (ibid.: 7).)  In this way, the medical establishment seeks 
to rectify and/or cure ambiguity of any kind and so sex reassignment and hormone 
therapy is a normalising and corrective means of regulating ambiguous bodies and 
gender dysphoric subjects.  And it is in this way that medical knowledge 
establishes “a wrong body” discourse that produces a transgender – and specifically 
the transsexual – subject:  transwomen are women in a man’s body and not merely 
women who happen to have a penis. 
 
Given the privileging of medical discourse in bodily matters, perhaps it is 
not surprising that some of the earliest work in geographical analyses of bodies 
appears in the subdiscipline of medical geography.  Early medical geographers 
concerned themselves with a conceptualisation of the body as a vector of disease, a 
site of contamination, and an organism of ill health. While it has been noted that 
the human geographer has tended to discount the non-human sphere of nature and 
physical objects (Bakker and Bridge, 2006) some feminist and queer geographers 
have turned to exploring the materiality of the body, how subjectivities are 
constituted through the body, itself a site of knowledge production. Research in 
bodily geographies has concerned itself with the biological and psychical 
materiality of the situated self, how subjectivity and identity form through the 
social experience of the physical body and through discursive practices.  For 
example, some geographers have studied the norms of eating practices and body 
bigness, deconstructing the medicalisation of body size and obesity discourses 
(Evans, 2006; Colls, 2006). 
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David Valentine questions whether the distinction between gender and 
sexuality is simply a description of the way things are, or if the claim that gender 
and sexuality are distinct is productive of such a distinction. The simple categories 
of sexuality or gender orders certain experiences while erasing some complications.  
From a Foucauldian perspective, the distinction of gender-normative 
(homo)sexuality and transgender is a modern technology of power/knowledge.  
Valentine argues that the separation of gender and sexuality as two separate and 
distinct ontological categories was exploited by gay and lesbian activists under a 
new system of homonormativity.  Homonormativity has emerged as an artefact of 
the assimilationist agenda of respectability of many gay and lesbian citizens, in 
opposition to the radical queer rejection of heteronormative values.  Counterpublic 
sexualised spaces such as leathersex bars, cruising areas, and other spaces of queer 
territoriality are now deemed by the gay community as embarrassments, the least 
desirable and assimilable zones of (male) homosexual culture, as gay conservatism 
is a moralising politics that calls for the self-policing of “deviant” behaviour.  Such 
politics would rely on gays’ invisibility within public spaces.  Left politics have no 
place in this scheme and lesbians are often excluded, given their legacy with 
radical notions of feminism.  Gay conservatism is about white, middle class men 
who demand the privileges promised to them at birth (but are stripped of in 
adulthood because they happen to have sex with men).  Passing is also important 
here, as passing is the key to sexual citizenship (discussed shortly) and assimilation 
(Bell and Binnie, 2000).  Indeed, for gay conservatives invisibility and assimilation 
are key components to their politics.  Assimilationist gays and lesbians’ political 
projects aim to minimise the difference between heterosexuality and 
homosexuality, as gender-normative homosexuals show no publicly visible signs 
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(such as male femininity) of that which is a private exercise of sexuality.  Indeed, it 
is the overt visibility of that which is transgender within the queer community that 
calls into question the gender stability of gender-normative gays and lesbians.  
Further to this, the emergence of the category of transgender discursively removes 
the stigma of gender deviance from gay and lesbian.  As Wilchins (2004: 18) puts 
it: “For many gay men, gender is yet another closet to come out of.”  
 
In an early text, written with Wichins, Valentine (1997) discusses the social 
construction of the body and is specifically concerned with not only the ways 
people alter their bodies but the construction of identities around bodies that are not 
culturally understandable in terms of existing binary categories.  To him, the 
altering of bodies calls into play new questions of difference and power, 
specifically the policing of these bodies by cultural means.  In policing social space 
and the bodies therein, Foucault’s use of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon as a 
metaphor for surveillance is of particular interest.  The panopticon is an 
architectural technology of a building in the form of a ring.  In the centre of this 
ring is a tower facing the inner face of the ring.  The outer building is divided into 
cells, each the width of the building itself.  Each of these cells has two windows: 
one facing the tower, the other on the opposite wall, allowing light to seep in.  The 
tower’s surveiller surveys the silhouettes of the cell’s captives (see Image 1, next 
page).  It was considered an easy and effective exercise of power.  This policing 
produced a politics of space and visibility inscribed in architecture.  Visibility is 
organised around a dominating gaze and the technology of the panopticon 
was not so much to punish wrongdoers as to prevent even the possibility 
of wrongdoing, by immersing people in a field of total visibility where the 
opinion, observations and discourse of others would restrain them from 
harmful acts. (Foucault 1980: 153) 
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The only downside of the panopticon was the fear of darkened, and thus 
unregulated, space which prevents the visibility of the person being regulated.  It is 
in this sense that visibility produces surveillance (Thompson, 2004). 
 
Indeed, it is the technology of the panopticon that allows for interiorisation 
of a total, omniscient gaze.  A surveiller need not watch the cells, as the potential 
for surveillance will result in each individual interiorising the gaze so that the 
individual will exercise surveillance over – and against – themselves.  This ideal 
surveillance cancels human agency; it is this penetrative element of the gaze that 
polices gender “wrongdoing” and produces a “good citizen” within a certain 
knowledge/power matrix.  The assimilationist agenda has privileged the 
internalised gaze as part of its politics: Gender-normative gays and lesbians self-
police their gender in such a way that it cannot be questioned or misinterpreted, 
thus demonstrating that their sexuality is distinct from their gender.   
 
Image 1.  Interior of Cuba’s Presidio Modelo prison, an example of panoptic architecture. 
Silhouettes of prisoners would be surveilled by the watchtower.  DigitalCrossRhodes.com (2009) 
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Of course, the panopticon metaphor is not without its critics.  Stephen 
Green (1999) prefers plague management to the panopticon to socially police.  
Plague management assumes every person is susceptible to any effect and aims for 
categorisation, not normalisation like the panopticon. He argues that plague 
management is a more effective tool since the technologies of surveillance are 
located within the community, with the community socially policing all members 
in a particular space and aligning abnormalities to categories for treatment or 
eradication.  However, though plague management does not shift the gaze 
internally, it can be conceptualised as a more obvious model to socially police a 
strict gender dualism through community regulatory practices rather than self-
regulating practices; imagine, for example, violence on effeminate men resulting in 
all men acting to remove any traces of effeminacy.   
 
 However, positions of gender and sexuality as distinct, but related, 
demonstrate that that which is gender and that which is sexuality have ontological 
status that may or may not act upon the other (along with race, class, culture, and 
nationality, of course).  For Valentine, though, this ontological seperateness ignores 
the complexity of lived experience.   He demonstrates this through interviews with 
people that activists and social service providers would categorise as transgender, 
but whom complicate the notion of a transgender identity.  For example, Valentine 
described Anita as transgender in his understanding of the term, as she had been 
taking female hormones since she was a teenager: 
 Anita: I consider… yes, yes, but I know what I – I know what I am, but I… 
I… you know, I treat myself like a woman, you know.  I do everything like 
a woman.  I act like a woman, I move like a woman, you know. I do 
everything like – everything like a woman. 
 DV: Do you consider yourself to be gay, then? 
 Anita: Yes! 
 DV: Yeah. 
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 Anita: Yes. 
 DV: Yeah.  Um 
 Anita: Yes. 
 DV: Even though you live as a woman. 
 Anita: Yes. 
 DV: Right, ok. 
 Anita: I know I’m gay and I know I’m a man. (Valentine, 2007: 115) 
 
Anita shows the complications of lived experience upon the transgender category 
and the limits of transgender as an identity.  Anita knows she is “gay” and “a man,” 
but she also knows that everything she does is “like a woman” and is therefore read 
as transgender.  In fact, in his field work at the New York Lesbian and Gay 
Community Services Center and the surrounding areas, Valentine found many 
people on whom the transgender category would be placed, but identified as gay 
men and saw their gender variance as part of their (homo)sexuality – and this was 
not limited to male-bodied women.  Jade, an older female-bodied individual who 
identifies as a “mother,” “lesbian,” and a “man,” found the word transgender not 
representative of her experience because “the word ‘trans’ was only used in 
‘transsexual,’ meaning you were flipping over, changing your organs” (ibid.)  
Valentine considers that this is not merely a mis- or non-education issue and that 
some gay-identified people would adopt the transgender label and abandon their 
gay identity if they were better informed of it.  Rather, for many gender-variant 
people, personal experiences cannot be accounted for so easily by the categories 
homosexuality or transgender; both sexual and gendered experiences exceed the 
boundaries of their categories. 
 
Being Transgender 
In 2007, the Human Rights Commission published To Be Who I Am: Report 
of the Inquiry into Discrimination Experienced by Transgender People (Human 
Rights Commission, 2007), the findings of its inquiry of everyday struggles that 
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affect the transgendered community.  Launched in 2006, it was the first inquiry by 
a national human rights organisation to look at transgender issues regarding health 
services, citizenship, and social policy.  While my research is not centred on the 
transgender subject within Aotearoa New Zealand, the inquiry provides insights 
into the public experiences of the transgender subject within a Western cultural 
framework in various areas: 
• Education. The inquiry recognised that transgendered children face barriers to 
education and participation in school life in respect to preferred name use, sex-
specific school uniforms, safety, and participation in sports.  While some trans 
youth will seek assistance and participation in on-campus groups designed for 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual students, many heterosexual trans youth may not seek 
support as they do not identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual, suggesting the 
ontological separation of gender and sexuality. 
• Public life.  The inquiry recognised that access to employment and housing is 
negatively affected for transitioning (and transitioned) transpeople. A number of 
participants in the study were not able to obtain employment and felt moved out 
of current employment through increased workloads or other measures.  Limited 
access to employment led many participants into prostitution and illegal activity. 
• Safety.  Discrimination and harassment was measured on a scale of low level 
(such as avoidance, insults, and denied access to public places) to high level 
(such as physical and/or sexual abuse).  While the report acknowledges most 
instances of discrimination and harassment were low level, violence remained a 
constant theme amongst participants.   
• Health. Diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder is required for a patient to be 
referred to secondary health services (for example, hormone treatment).  Many 
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patients with pre-existing mental health conditions were told their gender issues 
were a symptom of their pre-existing condition.  Many transpeople also believed 
their primary health practitioner was ill-educated in trans health, with one 
patient reminding her doctor to conduct regular tests of liver function once 
hormone therapy commenced.  District Health Boards required patients to fit 
under restrictive criteria for free, public treatment, leading most to pay for all 
health-related treatments that are deemed cosmetic out of pocket.2  Additionally, 
for transwomen, surgery is available in only one New Zealand city. 
 
Four out of five submissions to the inquiry described some form of 
discrimination from school, work, in public space, by government agencies, and by 
health practitioners.  Further to this, most simply expected to be discriminated 
against as it was so common in their experiences.  While many participants noted 
positive relationships with their primary health practitioner, others described the 
difficulties they experienced.  Some transpeople did not feel their primary health 
practitioners had sufficient knowledge on hormone treatment and wanted to speak 
directly to an endocrinologist, however doing so is made near impossible without a 
previous diagnosis and referral.  Additionally, district health boards’ prioritisation 
criteria exclude many patients on the grounds that trans-related services are seen as 
cosmetic.  The Ministry of Health conducted a survey in 2003 requesting 
information from district health boards regarding the treatment of transpeople, with 
only seventeen of the twenty-one boards responding.  Eight boards responded that 
no services are provided and two provided services if the patient met criteria.  Only 
one board provided comprehensive services.  This has caused many individuals 
                                                 
2 In 2003 the Ministry of Health changed the guidelines for the Special High Cost Treatment Pool to 
fund four sex reassignment surgeries every two years, three for transwomen and one for transmen. 
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who wish to begin transitioning to circumnavigate the public health system and 
seek private care at cost, both domestically and through medical tourism.   
 
Additionally, it was noted that some health practitioners discussed whether 
or not gender identity disorder was a mental health illness: “Psych assessments are 
required because it is in the DSM-IV.  But it is not a mental disorder.  Someone 
who is transgender is normal and more normal once they have had surgery” (59, 
emphasis mine).   
 
The term sexual citizenship is often used to describe the sexual rights and 
access to general rights of groups and how these impact sexuality and the agency of 
the state.  Sociologist Kenneth Plummer (1995) further describes this as an intimate 
citizenship concerning people’s rights to choose their relationships, gender, desires, 
and what they wish to do with their bodies.  This is a concept that queer-politics-as-
antinormalisation has essentially used in terms of demanding space(s) for dissident 
sexualities and questioning the “good gay” model of assimilable citizenship 
(Monro and Warren, 2004).   
 
In part, sexual citizenship demands a reconfiguration of public and private 
and a (re)negotiation of the public/private divide (Bell and Binnie, 2000).  The 
home of normative heterosexuality is the typical “private” space, whereas politics, 
commerce, and anything that exists outside the home is public space.  
Traditionally, sexuality is prescribed to the private sphere and is therefore reduced 
to the presumptively apolitical (Martin, 2000).  Queer politics subvert the divide 
between private and public and the supposed inappropriateness of the private in the 
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public. Cultural theorist Fran Martin (ibid.) describes the reconfiguration of public 
and private spaces in Taipei’s New Park, which also illustrates the idea of “good” 
and “bad” queer sexuality: 
[T]he rhetoric of the City Government effectively produces two kinds of 
sexuality.  One is characterised by class-bound practices of consumption 
(attendance in commercial gay venues), and constitutes the imagined 
subject of US-influenced minority rights discourses cited by the 
administration in order to project an image of Taipei as a ‘modern 
democratic city.’ The second kind of homosexuality, by contrast, …is the 
rather declassé kind of homosexuality, whose subject is imagined not to be 
a ‘white-collar worker’ but rather to be a student or unemployed, and to 
utilise free, public space for the practice of his sexuality, rather than 
commercial leisure spaces.  (ibid.: 85-86) 
 
Taipei’s New Park demonstrates the ways in which neoliberal urban restructuring 
and the politics of homonormativity work in tandem.  For Martin, the degree of 
“good” or “bad” queerness is bound up in class and consumption practices.  
Geographers David Bell and Jon Binnie (2004) also suggest the queer consumer is 
more acceptable than the (queer) sexual citizen, as seen in the pink economy 
discourse.  Global gay tourism and the proliferation of globalised Pride and Mardi 
Gras events are just two examples of the queer consumer’s placement in public 
space. However, gay commercial spaces place emphasis on “appropriate bodies, 
clothes and behaviour” (ibid.: 1814) which produces more possibilities of 
homonormative exclusion.  In this way, gay gentrification and gay spaces of 
consumption are acceptable, but leathersex bars and spaces that are utilised for 
public sex are not. 
 
The act of coming out itself is a statement that sexuality is not simply a 
private affair designated to only the domestic space of one’s life.  It is in this way 
that private space is seen in part as a space of oppression and invisibility. Sullivan 
(1995) argues that heterosexuals are tolerant of private queers, but not public 
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queers and suggests that a public disapproval and private tolerance is sustainable.  
It is important to discuss queer visibility in public space since visibility is 
privileged in identity politics and homosexuality (concomitant with a presumed 
gender variance) is assessed visually. While becoming visible is to render one’s 
subjectivity legitimate and legible in discourse, it may not always be the safest 
political device for subversion. There is safety and acceptance in choosing to 
occupy a less or non- transgressive space and/or a fixed, stable (gender) identity.   
 
From Public to Virtual Space 
 With the limitation afforded to queer individuals in public space, it is not 
surprising that queer subjects have looked to alternate concepts of space.  Utilising 
virtual space is a way for queers to claim their own space(s) of sexual citizenship, 
their own multiplicity of identities and subjectivities. Marginalised groups have 
turned to the internet for the expression of unconventional, so-called deviant 
behaviours (Hegland and Nelson, 2002). 
 
 The internet provides an avenue in which people can create a virtual social 
space to meet and interact with others.  Various scholars have noted that 
communities have assigned communications media a prominent role in maintaining 
social spheres.  Media provides a way for knowledge to be (re)produced and 
dispersed since it “helps people maintain contact with members of their social 
network or group, cultivate ties, and garner aid and resources, including 
information” (Kavanaugh et al., 2005: 119).  Internet services can be utilised to 
strengthen social ties and exchange information.  However, it is important to note 
that internet services are not simply a commodity, but a form of cultural production 
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that produces its own consuming subjects.  Its users, then, are discursive effects 
themselves that perpetuate their own terms of reference. 
 
Exploring cyberspace as a site of expression provides new opportunities for 
examining issues that surround gender, sexuality, and identity.  Cyberactivism has 
expanded possibilities for resistance, potential to advance efforts for social justice 
for all so-called cyberqueers and cyber-ethnography has developed as a tool for 
understanding online communities and individuals (Snyder, 2002).  Counter-
hegemonic groups have the possibility to use information for political action, as 
dispersed individuals with similar interests or politics can connect in cyberspace.  
With virtual space, individuals are liberated from the constraints of public space 
and have the potential to produce new social geographies.  In this way, the virtual 
community emerges as a result of the social implication of internet use. Virtual 
space is less of a fiction than a new way of communicating with individuals and 
communities and is reimagined as territorial systems analogous to neighbourhood, 
city, etc. (Graham, 1998) 
 
Creating and colonising virtual space is an act of political disturbance, a 
demand for a utopian imagined community.  While it creates a safe environment 
for users to take advantage of visibility and advocacy, online networks have 
indefinite boundaries, shifting and dynamic and the centre/periphery dichotomy is 
potentially deconstructed. Indeed, the possibilities of virtual space may queer 
ontologies of space, as it is a site of identity, multiplicity, performativity, and 
resistance. 
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The internet is also a place to reflect on how queers represent ourselves.  
Representations by gays and lesbians online tend to be constructed in essentialist 
notions, with the articulation of queerness as central to the user’s life (Alexander, 
2002).  This is in direct contrast to the potentiality of virtual space as a site of 
multiplicity and contradictory subject formation. 
 
One instance of looking at transgendered subjects online is cultural theorist 
Mark McLelland’s (2002) study of the Japanese “newhalf.”  Newhalf (nyuuhaafu) 
is an Anglo-Japanese term used to describe transgendered men that typically 
perform in the sex industry offering services to gender normative men.  Whether 
pre- or postoperative, newhalf see themselves as an intermediate sex.  Newhalf 
sites are typically run by transvestite/transsexual cabarets and bars that both 
promote the bar itself and allow a space for newhalf to discuss who they are.  One 
site McLelland identified promoted its services to gender normative men as 
follows: 
“We, the newhalf at Aventure, try to ensure that all our customers feel 
satisfied and secure so that [they can experience] enjoyable sex by using 
our hearts, bodies, skills and magic. We respectfully wait for your visit 
from the bottom of our hearts.  Credit cards accepted.” (ibid.: 172) 
 
While the newhalf market themselves to gender normative men, there is no mention 
by McLelland that these men are homo- or heterosexual-identified, but that is not 
necessarily the point.  What is important is that the newhalf use the internet as a 
resource to promote their subjectivity, embodiment, and services to a public 
audience. 
 
 Sociologist Nina Wakeford (1997) is concerned with the political economy 
of cyberqueer articulation, though warns the reader to not think of the cyberqueer 
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as “a celebration of parody and performance, or the simplistic application of an 
author’s reading of Gender Trouble” (ibid.: 412).  Additionally, media scholar Kate 
O’Riordan (2007) seeks to consider ways in which both cyber and queer discourses 
have “offered/produced subjectivities, both as identities and as imagined positions” 
(ibid.: 13).  She examines the ways in which the cyber and queer metaphors and 
discourses intersect with the imagined and material body.  Challenged by Wakeford 
to not rely on simplistic readings, O’Riordan asserts that the mapping of cyber on 
queer and vice versa will expose the ways in which cyberqueer is performative, a 
project that refuses to reduce performativity to mere expression.  In this way the 
mapping of the cyber subject on and to the queer subject provides moments of what 
Butler calls productive “slippage.” 
 
 Considerable attention is given to the way the internet can allow for new 
constructions of identity.  Internet users can construct a multitude of identities in 
forums and blogs and on message boards and homepages.  In virtual space, identity 
is malleable and fluid.  Internet users sound curiously similar to Donna Haraway’s 
(1991) conceptualisation of cyborgs, chimeras that are simultaneously human and 
machine.  As hybrids, cyborgs call into question that which is normatively human 
by breaking down the boundary between human and non-human (machine).  
Cyborgs are at once virtual and imaginative and material reality.  As humans and 
machines become more interdependent, the fine line between the human and our 
non-human extensions (for example, the internet) is queered. Most importantly, 
cyborg internet users can disestablish conformist identities while online. 
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Technoscientific innovations have changed the ways in which we 
communicate and reconfigure physical space, procreation and intimacy and the 
internet is increasingly becoming embedded in our world (Graham, 1999 and 
Wilson and Peterson, 2002).  The internet is expanding our lexicon and reshaping 
the way people communicate and interact.  Importantly, the internet is 
reconfiguring how gendered identities are negotiated and (re)produced. The 
internet is of particular use to feminism and queer theory since “it is the non-
hierarchal nature of cyberspace, and its nature as network, which makes it a proto-
feminist medium” (Graham, 1999: 430). Situated histories of sociocultural 
practices and ideologies of technoscience emerge along with new technologies. 
 
 As demonstrated in this literature review, poststructuralist critiques can 
provide a way to rethink ontological categories and consider marginalised and 
problematised perspectives.  Poststructuralism is critical of an autonomous human 
agent and considers subjects as constitutive of and constituted by a multitude of 
discourses and cultural meanings, for example cultural meanings of male and 
(only) female.  While newer political understandings of gender developed within 
the early gay/lesbian liberation movement, gender has subsequently been denied a 
place within gay/lesbian politics that have produced – and been (re)produced by – a 
contemporary ontological separation of sexuality and gender, which effectively 
reified homosexuality as unproblematically, politically gender-normative.  A return 
to conservative, assimilationist sexual politics have marginalised some gays, 
lesbians, and transpeople.  The proliferation of virtual space may be a queer, post-
public possibility for these marginalised categories, but brings with it its own, 
newer discursive practices. 
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3  
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Even in the worst of times, however, we must not simply succumb to 
the institutional forces recreating hierarchy.  We must always push at 
the margins, push at the limits, push at ourselves. 
-Sherry Gorelick, Contradictions of 
Feminist Methodology (1991) 
 
 
 Geography’s seemingly androcentric nature effectively either renders 
gender invisible or has discussed it as something exotic and/or tangential.  
However feminist critiques by geographers have recognised the positivist nature of 
the discipline (for examples see Rose, 1993 and 1997, Nash, 1996, and Longhurst, 
2008).  The subdiscipline of feminist geography has emerged and appropriated 
poststructuralist feminist theory and methodology to reinvigorate geographical 
inquiry and the discipline's knowledge-claims and suggesting that identity is 
“riddled with – even formed through – mistakes, misrecognitions, fantasies, 
instabilities and contradictions” (Rose, 1993: 6). 
 
 For sociologist Sherry Gorelick (1991) feminist methodological critiques 
have three interrelated levels: philosophical, moral, and practical.  At the 
philosophical level lies a critique of positivism’s pretense of value-free research 
and knowledge production based on empirical fact-finding.  At the moral level is 
the critique of the objectification of subjects and their exploitation by the 
researcher who studies them as things, thereby reducing “human beings to social 
facts” (ibid.: 460). As feminist researchers, we need to reject the 
researcher/researched dichotomy.  At the practical level is a critique of dominant 
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methodologies that may not realise that the researcher and the researched may have 
different agendas that can lead to distortions in the research project, as “a subject 
population does not tell the truth to those in power” (ibid.: 461).  It is in this way 
that feminist approaches interrupt the knowledge production of the truth factory, to 
not only describe oppression but to challenge it. 
 
While feminist geographers have argued that patriarchy and whiteness 
maintain their privilege by operating in a state of unawareness, queer geographers 
add that both heterosexuality and cisgender privilege maintain themselves in 
similar states of unawareness through presumed heterosexuality and presumed 
congruence of social gender and biological gender assignment.  Poststructuralist by 
nature, queer theories insist that space is not only gendered, but sexualised, as well; 
space is not naturally heterosexual, but rather is produced and heterosexualised.  
Queer geographies would seek to challenge the heterosexism of geographical 
knowledge.  Since a queer epistemology would inform methodological questions, it 
is important to establish what queer epistemologies might be within the structures 
of geography. 
 
 Similar to feminist geographies, queer geographies insist it is a hetero-
masculinist notion that the researcher can distance him/herself from the object of 
research (Binnie, 1997). The researcher must recognise his or her own 
subjectivities and its possible bias.  Not surprisingly, queer epistemological 
approaches would remain cautious of positivist claims, especially considering the 
pathologisation of sexual and gender deviance within dominant discourses 
informed by biology, medicine, and psychiatry.  For geographer Jon Binnie (ibid.), 
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a queer epistemology would be based on not only a commitment to embodiment in 
research, but a recognition of the value of camp, which appears to reminds people 
that what we see is only a view of life, and a disavowal that those who produce 
cultural landscapes know more about this view of life than those who inhabit 
cultural landscapes.   For the purposes of this thesis, I define camp as in line with 
to Binnie, as well as utilising media scholar Andy Medhurst’s (1991: 156) 
definition of camp as a new and complex relationship to the serious, to be “serious 
about the frivolous, frivolous about the serious,” in a manner to delegitimate 
hegemonic points of view through allusion.  Camp appeal can facilitate visibility of 
queer subjects and undermine values and truths, such as the presumed 
heterosexuality – and I would argue the cisgendering – of social space.   Camp, too, 
is a relief that “offers a space to those dissatisfied by the sharp edges of fixed 
boundaries of identity politics” (Binnie, 1997: 231).  Instead, queer approaches can 
be “full of camp, attitude, and anger” (ibid.:  232). 
 
 Queer’s use of combining camp playfulness and political messages is perhaps 
best illustrated through anthropologist Margot D. Weiss’s discussion of San 
Francisco’s radical queer group Gay Shame, which uses “humor, satire, and camp to 
stage street protests, blending theatrical style with a radical political message” 
(Weiss, 2008: 87):   
Some of their recent actions include (1) spray-painting sidewalks with 
antimarriage and antigentrification messages; (2) organizing a protest to the 
“Cutest of the Castro” beauty pageant; (3) participating in the city’s large 
Iraq war protests; and (4) holding two award ceremonies, targeting 
institutions and individuals who should be ashamed of their disservice to the 
queer community, progressive politics, and social justice. In 2002, for 
example, Mary Cheney (Dick’s daughter) won the “Helping Right-Wingers 
Cope” award for acting as a liaison between the gay and lesbian community 
and Coors Brewery. The same year, the Pottery Barn at the intersection of 
Market and Castro Streets won the “Making More Queers Homeless” award 
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for contributing to population displacement in the ongoing gentrification of 
the queer neighborhood. (ibid.: 91) 
 
And in 2005 
 
when the San Francisco Department of Public Health papered the Castro 
neighborhood with posters featuring a shirtless, muscular black man with the 
caption “Don’t be a bitch – Use a condom,” Gay Shame produced a 
counterposter, retorting, “Be a bitch.” The poster read, in part: “By 
reasserting stereotypical notions equating femininity with passivity, the 
Department of Public Health is rolling back decades of bitches fiercely 
confronting male power… this ad campaign makes effeminate, queer black 
men, gender non-conformists, and trannies invisible or powerless… 
masculinity doesn’t protect anyone from HIV. What we need is a sexual 
culture that encourages respect, open communication, flamboyance, gender 
transgression, creativity, collective pleasure, celebration, experimentation, 
and transformation. Turn it out, honey. BE A BITCH.” (ibid.: 92) 
 
I employ queer theory not simply to address how sexuality may or may not 
be implicated in gender, but also because, whether cisgender or transgender, all 
individuals have some type of sexuality (even if that sexuality is a lack of sexuality, 
or asexuality), and also because of the limits of some feminists to male inclusion, 
excluding the possibilities of men as feminists.  For example, for Liz Stanley, a 
sociologist and feminist auto/biographer, 
feminism is not merely a ‘perspective’ or viewpoint on the world, not even 
an epistemology or a theory of knowledge about it; feminism constitutes 
ontology, a different way of being in the world which is rooted in the facts 
of oppression… I argue that men cannot share a feminist ontology nor its 
resultant epistemology.  Consequently, men cannot write feminist 
auto/biography in the sense that I understand it. (Stanley, 1992: 251) 
 
I would argue that self-reflexivity can allow males to not only realise, but also 
attempt to reject privilege, even if they are the benefactors of patriarchy 
themselves.  Men can also critique structures of Euroheteropatriarchy, which I 
define as those structures that privilege whites, heterosexuals, and males – and 
especially the combination of two or all three – and have a politics of equality 
between gender(s), race, and class, not to mention subversive politics that seek to 
undermine these structures. Further to this, her essentialist and limited feminism 
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ignores the possibility of a male-bodied woman (or male-bodied bi-/nongender 
person) engaging in the broader third wave feminisms and also erases the effects 
and marginalisation heteropatriarchy has on queer men and the coalition and 
mutual understanding of two entities patriarchy equally despises: women and 
feminine men.  Additionally, Stanley’s view has the potential to perpetuate the 
feminazi view of feminism as angry, man-hating, and focused on a new superiority 
(that of women) with its own exclusionary discourses.  All said, however, it is less 
arguable that men can have a queer ontology, even if Stanley wishes to exclude 
them from a feminist ontology.   
 
Self-reflexivity is also a feminist practice in destabilising positivist 
research.  Feminist philosopher Sandra Harding (1987: 6) notes that "the origin of 
scientific problems or hypotheses is irrelevant to the "goodness" of the results of 
research." That is, inquiry can come from magic, religion, or observation; all that 
matters is the measurable scientific logic of the resulting knowledge and it is in the 
test that our faith lies.  For feminists, reflexivity and embodiment leads to the very 
questions that are asked.  Might I even care about homonormativity or the 
oppression of transpeople if I weren't queer?  If I were heterosexual, would my 
inquiry lie elsewhere?  Since reflexivity figures in both feminist and queer praxis, I 
will discuss my own positionality through the following intertext. 
 
Intertext: The Life of an American Gay 
I decided to unwind by watching an episode of Friends, in syndication on 
TVNZ, and the pervasive mainstream fear of gender transgression showed its face 
again.  This particular episode, titled The One with Chandler’s Dad, left me a bit 
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unsettled.  In one of the first scenes, Joey notices that Phoebe’s new boyfriend is 
wearing women’s panties.  He confronts Phoebe about this as follows: 
Joey: Listen, you know how, uh, when you’re wearing pants and you lean 
forward I check out your underwear? 
Phoebe: Yeah. 
Joey: Well, when Jake did it I saw that… he was wearing women’s 
underwear! 
Phoebe: I know. They were mine. 
Joey: Oh. (Laughs.) No! No wait, that’s weird! 
Phoebe: No, it’s not! We were just goofing around and I dared him to try 
them on. 
Joey: That’s weird! 
Phoebe: I’m wearing his briefs right now. 
Joey: That’s…kinda hot. 
Phoebe:  I think so too. And that little flap? Great for holding my lipstick. 
Joey: Yeah, I wouldn’t know about that. 
Phoebe: And! Y’know what Jake says? That women’s underwear is 
actually more comfortable. And he loves the way the silk feels against his 
skin. 
Joey: Yeah well next thing you know, he’ll be telling you that your high 
heels are good for his posture! 
Phoebe: There is nothing wrong with Jake, okay? He is all man.  I’m 
thinking even more than you. 
Joey:  Oh yeah, he looked like a real lumberjack in those pink lacies. 
Phoebe: I’m just saying that only a man completely secure with his 
masculinity could walk around in women’s underwear. I don’t think you 
could ever do that. 
Joey:  Hey! I am secure with my masculinity. (Friends, 2001) 
 
Awkwardly discussing another man’s masculinity, Joey is secure enough with his 
own masculinity – so secure that he will not spiral into a troubling femininity like 
Phoebe’s boyfriend might – that he later borrows a pair of roommate Rachel’s 
panties and tries them on.  But after he confides in Phoebe to liking them, they 
decide he has gone too far.  Why should the show’s hypermasculine ladies’ man be 
so ashamed of having gone too far in discussing how women’s panties might feel?  
Is there something essentially female about silk in one particular shape?  Would 
that make his masculinity suspect?  And what would that say about his sexuality, if 
he liked womanly things?  Perhaps I was so unsettled by the episode because the 
show was one of the most popular sitcoms of its time and reached a very broad 
audience globally, and in this case obviously relied on and reified notions of proper 
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masculinity and proper femininity.  Simply put, Joey is scared of being thought of 
as gay because of gender deviance.3 
 
More importantly, will people know I’m queer from my own femininity?  
For most of my teenage and adult life, my relationship with my body has been 
regulated by a need to be accepted by The Gay Community, a disavowal (both 
scholarly and emotional) of even a “gay community,” an envy of women's bodies, 
psychotropic medication ranging from antidepressants to antipsychotics, OCD, 
dysthymic depression, eating disorders, weightloss aids, shame, and a need to be 
validated by others.  I suppose queers are more aware of their embodiment than 
straight, cisgender people.  Gay men's bodies are often regulated by “the scene” 
and/or a need to classify their materiality as twinks, bears, otters, cubs, etc.4  
Similarly, I suppose, transgender people are acutely aware of their physicality as a 
bodyscape written by gender performance, whether they are genderfucking or 
feeling they are in the wrong body. 
 
I am not manly.  I am not “straight-acting” - or gender 
normative/hegemonically masculine – as many, mostly conservatives, in the gay 
community often seem to fetishise and prefer.  Like the transpeople David 
Valentine encountered, “I am what I am.”  I may not fit idealised models of the 
gay/queer male, and it has taken a long time to feel happy with who I am, but I am 
what I am: a non-normative gay man that loves his “feminine side” as much as his 
                                                 
3 It is also the episode where we first meet Chandler’s gay, drag queen father, played by Kathleen 
Turner.  Kathleen Turner’s husky voice and slight butchness was, strangely enough, the source of her 
sexiness in the 1980s, similar to Joey’s finding Phoebe wearing men’s underwear “hot.”  But now, as 
an aging, presumably postmenopausal actress, her suspect femininity is the stuff of sitcom jokes: She 
is a “manly” woman playing a man pretending to be a woman. 
4 A quick internet search will provide information on the proliferation of corporeal types in gay 
preference, lifestyles, and  erotica. 
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“masculinity” – and I often feel there is no one interested in my experience.  I do 
not really embrace ontological notions of the gay community (always in italics or 
quotes) or the transgender community(s).  I love the subtlety and floweriness of 
Britney Spears perfumes (I hate overpowering male colognes), but... well, there is 
not much of my masculinity I am proud of, to be honest, though maybe I am too 
much of a feminist to be truly objective (eat your heart out, Liz Stanley!).  I 
understand a hegemonically masculine performance may be fetishised, but it is 
certainly not me, not who I am. 
 
Growing up in the United States, I had always had female friends.  I never 
noticed anything wrong with my sense of my masculinity until my sisters noted 
that all my friends were female (and consequently I should have male friends) and I 
was called a tomgirl in sixth grade.  I had never heard the term before, but I 
immediately knew its reference: tomboy.   Just as a tomboy was a masculine girl, I, 
as a tomgirl, was a feminine boy.  Tomboy was a derogatory term, so surely tomgirl 
was, as well.  I felt shame.  I felt embarrassed.  I failed at what I knew was 
expected of me.  And as someone who knew he was gay, I was scared that I would 
have to bear the burden of being emblematic of an entire people when I was only a 
child myself. 
 
I met my first close male friend in fifth grade when I was 9 years old.  
Though I was (looking back) rather camp and he was camp, we insisted on our 
heterosexuality:  he told me of the female classmate he had a crush on and I told 
him of the female classmate I had a crush on.  In fact, I didn't become aware of his 
admitted (confessed?) homosexuality until after university, long after we had lost 
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touch, when we reconnected rather superficially on a social networking website – 
facebook.com – in which he listed himself as “interested in men” and in a 
relationship with another man.  While there is much preliminary discussion of the 
internet as anonymous, real-life use of internet resources, such as this, show that 
the internet is a way of announcing one's real-life identity in a way that may be 
difficult or complicated in real life.  Take him or leave him, meet with him again or 
not in “real life,” he proclaimed who he was proud to be.  
 
But our campness – or anyone's campness – is directly related to an 
ontology of gender, but is more complicated than the notion of gender alone.  
Female femininity is typically not camp, but male femininity is.  Before we were 
even sexual, what would be seen as our sexual identity was coded as gendered.  I 
was, after all, a tomgirl. Whether we realised it at the time, we occupied a certain 
social space that played with both sexuality and gender.  I was certain of my 
sexuality, but still in the gender closet because I assumed masculine gays are 
somehow better than effeminate gays.  I mean, that’s what TV and movie 
characters, the few I did see, taught me.   
 
I met the first out gay people at university.  The first few I met helped to 
build my understanding of – and perhaps isolation from – the local gay community.  
They went to New York City gay clubs, perfected their appearances in mirrors, 
used expensive skin and hair care products.  They were, I remarked, a great deal 
like gay characters on television, which, looking back, can easily be forgiven for 
lack of a diverse reference.  This was the pre-out Ellen DeGeneres 1990s when a 
gay kiss had to be cut from the over the top television series Melrose Place to 
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avoid viewer outrage and commercial sponsors’ sensitivities.  Characters were 
caricatures and one-dimensional and this was how we learned to be what we were 
supposed to be.  I was nothing like that, I was just ordinary, a wallflower.  My 
rejection of and rejection from the scene made me feel inadequate and lost; I wasn’t 
gay enough.  
 
As most lost people do, I searched for answers.  I studied physical 
anthropology, focusing on primatology and social evolution.  I became fascinated 
with the pansexuality of bonobos, one of our closest relatives with whom we share 
over 98% of our DNA, as a possible biological source of (my own) homosexuality 
and I argued to anyone who would listen that selfish gene theory privileged the 
emergence of homosexuality because gay alloparenting reallocated resources to 
increase the reproductive fitness and heterosexual siblings’ offspring (for further 
discussion on primate and human social evolution see Jolly, 1999).  The biology of 
it was beginning to make sense, even if the human experience did not. 
 
 At the beginning of my fourth year at university, I met Amanda and 
Stefanie, two straight women (who would eventually politically identify as queer 
straights), that opened my eyes to the politics within the gay community that I 
recognised but about which I could never seem to make a cogent argument without 
appealing to my emotions.  We were a radical little group: Who cares about gay 
marriage?  Marriage as a system of privileging certain relationships was the 
problem and gays and lesbians should want none of that!  Gaydar?  Isn’t that just 
the legitimisation of gender stereotype in an attempt to excuse the “obvious” claims 
of someone else’s sexuality?  I began enrolling in courses that were less based on 
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positivist science and more on social sciences, sexuality, and poststructuralism.  
We began discussing queer theories and postmodernism and the offensive 
assumptions enlightened people – gay or straight – seemed to always make.  And I 
grew angry and frustrated, but relieved that I could now articulate that frustration. 
  
 I suppose I proposed my current topic of research to think about what queer 
theories can – or cannot – do for me, as well as exploring queer theories that I did 
not know existed.  I’m no longer the devil-may-care, philosophising undergrad.  I 
have a full time job, bills, a stable relationship, desires to travel… Fuck, I’m 
turning into a polo-shirt wearing gay man and it’s only a matter of time before I put 
money and self-interests first and vote National or Act.  This research project gives 
me a social and theoretical space to remember the importance of real equality. 
 
In/Outsider and For Whom the Research is Designed 
 Reflecting on my own experience, I hoped to show how gender and 
sexuality are deeply entwined.  By coming out of the gender closet as well, I 
propose a politics of reaffirming gay/lesbian politics to transgender politics by way 
of mutual queer dissent.  By claiming a transgenderness through my own 
articulation of sexuality, I hope to destabilise the gender normativity of 
homonormative politics, calling to question the privileged stability of gender in 
some gay/lesbian politics. 
 
 In a way, this provides me with a sort of queered insider view of 
transgender, even though I may not identify as transgender outside of queer politics 
or academia.  However, it is this inability to completely fit in traditional notions of 
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transgender that leaves me equally as an outsider.  However, what I am claiming to 
do is to produce what historian Lisa Duggan refers to as bridge discourses, 
“political languages and strategies that can open dialogue across discursive gaps, 
generate critical challenges from one location to another, and produce negotiated 
interventions and actions” (Duggan, 2006a: 2).  Bridge discourses can (re)unite the 
LGBT community not through liberal rights claims, but rather through “the concept 
of sexual dissent, a concept that invokes a unity of speech, politics and practices, 
and forges a connection among sexual expressions, oppositional politics, and 
claims to public space” because “rather than invoking fixed, natural identities and 
asking for privacy or an end to discrimination, we must expand our right to public 
sexual dissent.  This is the path of access to public discourse and political 
representation” (ibid.: 5). 
 
 These bridge discourses are ways to describe our shared but different 
narratives.  By exposing my positionality, I hope to open my research to trans- and 
cispeople alike to engage with, even if it evokes some of anger I may have thus far 
displayed myself – particularly if it evokes any anger.  Sociologist Alison Jones 
(1992) suggests that feminist researchers' explicit partiality is what drives further 
dialogue.  For Jones, when a researcher uses their personal voice 
they are present as human beings; it is as though we are in conversation.  I 
see their words immediately as one point of view in our potential dialogue: 
'From here, things seem like this...' to which I can reply, 'Yes! I know what 
you mean!' or 'I never felt like that, rather like this...'. The text, written by 
the visible 'I', does not merely point, disembodied, to the world out there.  
Rather, it engages pleasurably shared communication about the world.  
There is more than just pleasure at steak here, of course, for the politics of 
the personal voice in these texts is the accessibility to them that it affords, 
along with some space for response. (ibid., 27) 
 
As a postmodern queer-feminist and an admitted outsider, I would celebrate a 
transperson telling me I got it all wrong because my own partiality failed to 
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recognise an effect.  I would also welcome that transperson to tell me the/their 
"right" version so that I may further reflect on and reshape my own ontologies. 
 
 As such, this thesis is not only written for academia, but also for activists.  
The liberal politics of American gay/lesbian activists has had only variable success 
when compared to the liberal politicking of women’s and civil rights decades ago; 
rights claims are still towered over by limited access to gay marriage (perhaps the 
holy grail of liberal LGBT politics), anti-discrimination reform, and the ever-
frightening post-9/11 conservative turn during the War on Terrorism.  For Duggan, 
it is necessary for activism to engage queer politics and bring “queer questions and 
knowledges into the domain of mainstream theoretical paradigms” (Duggan, 
2006b: 159).  For example, queer critiques of the LGBT status quo might give 
activists to “think about sexual difference not in terms of naturalised identities, but 
as a form of dissent” and to reflect on the way some political gains come at the 
expense of some of our constituency (Duggan, 2006d: 182) 
 
Oral History 
 Studying the oral histories and positionalities of transgender subjects is 
cruscial in this project.  For the purposes of this research, online discussions are to 
be considered oral histories of participants, as they provide important 
auto/biographies.  Stanley (1992) uses the term auto/biography to describe the 
epistemological and ontological notions of writing a life, whether biography or 
autobiography, that lays “claim to facticity, yet... are by nature artful enterprises 
which select, shape, and produce a very unnatural product” (ibid.: 3-4) because the 
biographer is a “socially-located person, one who is sexed, raced, classed, aged” 
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(ibid.: 7).  Indeed, the author produces a text as though he is of a unique self that 
creates a “piece of realist ideology which masks the social production of ideas” 
(ibid.: 16).   
Because memory inevitably has limits, the self we construct is necessarily 
partial; memory ties together events, persons, and feelings actually linked 
in only such accounts and not in life as it was lived; it equally necessarily 
relies on fictive devices in producing any and every account of the self it is 
concerned with.” (ibid.: 62)   
 
Auto/biography is to give account to complex and parallel historiographies.  
Feminist auto/biography locates the product within the processes of its own 
production.  The auto/biography, then, is not the truth, but a truth at a particular 
moment and disputes the “divisions between self/other, public/private, and 
immediate/memory” (ibid.: 42).  The auto/biographical I recognises that 
knowledge is subjective, contextual, and historically specific.  The self is a 
fabrication, slowly and selectively pieced together, often in hindsight.   
 
Content analysis is unobtrusive and allows for the study of cultural 
artefacts, such as life writing, and the analysis of texts and their production.  
Cultural artefacts “are the products of individual activity, social organisation, 
technology, and cultural patterns” and are typically not affected by the process of 
study (Reinharz, 1992: 147).  Studying cultural artefacts through the lens of queer 
theory exposes a heterosexist and even a homonormative culture.  Cultural 
documents shape norms, they do not merely reflect them. 
 
Oral sources in its variety of forms – including aural recordings, 
(auto)biographies, interview transcripts, diaries and blogs – provide knowledge that 
has been previously ignored and feminists first used oral history projects to provide 
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voices for women. According to oral historian Alessandro Portelli (1998), this 
allows for the production of knowledge of dispossessed groups whose written 
histories may be ignored or distorted.  Oral histories may provide less information 
on events themselves, but will provide additional meaning(s) to these events: how 
they are felt and how they are looked upon; this has lead critics to question the 
legitimacy of oral history projects (for further exploration, see oral historians 
Ronald Grele, 1998 and Luisa Passerini, 1998).  However, this should not imply 
that there is not factual basis for oral histories, but rather these histories are 
(re)shaped by one’s subjectivity, as memory itself is an active creation of meanings 
and it is this act of memory-making that is important. 
 
 Luisa Passerini argues that the notion of history as a catalogue of facts is a 
positivist practise.  In this way, the historian seeks to discover facts that will 
reconstruct the past as it was, to make knowledge-claims on the history instead of a 
history.  For Passerini,  
the raw material of oral history consists not just in factual statements, but is 
pre-eminently an expression and representation of culture that includes 
memory, ideology and subconscious desires and this may not coincide with 
hegemonic accounts of ‘what really happened’ (ibid.: 54). 
 
 
 Oral historian Joan Sangster (1998) is concerned with the ethical issues of 
oral historians interpreting others’ lives and whether the oral historian can separate 
the cultural discourses constructing that history.  Given the influences gender, 
sexuality, race, and class have on memories and experience, could transgender 
people (re)construct their memories based on essentialist notions of gender?  For 
Sangster, in order to contextualise oral histories it is important to survey the 
dominant ideologies shaping individual subjectivities.  In using oral history to 
 54 
explore the experiences of transgender people, it is important to understand the 
ways in which ideologies shape their own understanding(s) of gender. I need to 
also be aware of my research as strangely pornographic, studying the iconography 
of the transgendered body and my own (cis?)gender and academic privilege to gaze 
upon it.   
 
 
Research Resources 
 Online resources provide communication possibilities which do not exist in 
the cultural mainstream.  My focus is on how users represent themselves within 
virtual space, through published narratives and discussions.  As a textual analysis, 
it is believed I would need no further analysis of the text through personal 
interviews.  As such, no human ethics approval was sought since these narratives 
are published material that is publically available.   
 
 LiveJournal.com, discussed in Chapter 4, is a free web logging (“blogging”) 
service that prides itself on community building, self expression, and diversity. It is 
a community-building space that allows users to join communities based on a 
particular theme. Users register with the site and choose a unique username that 
offers anonymity from their identity in the material world, allowing users full, 
limitless expression. Users can search for other members and communities by 
interests and can friend other members or join relevant communities. Users also 
have the option to post entries as private or “friends only,” which means only 
chosen friends and community members can see and comment on their posts, 
offering another layer of anonymity and privacy. A preliminary search for 
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transgender-related communities shows that there are three-hundred and  
thirty-eight (388) communities already established on the interest in transgender. 
 
I have chosen the community Transgender Community ( transgender)5 
based on its popularity and frequent updates, which offers a wealth of material to 
be analysed (LiveJournal 2009b).  This community does not require an invitation 
code or moderator approval to join and read.  transgender has 3381 members and 
is moderated by community administrators who can delete or edit posts they deem 
offensive. As its name suggests, its interest – and presumably its members – covers 
the wide gamut of the transgender label.  This online community “exists to bring 
together people of all genders for discussion of transgender issues. Everyone who 
wants to discuss gender in an open and friendly manner is welcome.”  The 
community also provides community rules and guidelines in its profile.  Chapter 
Five is interested in Feministing.com, a feminist site that allows users to write 
blogs on various issues.  I look specifically at blogs that deal with transgender 
issues or concerns.  While transgender is a segregated community on 
LiveJournal, transgender blogs on Feministing are published and interspersed with 
non-transgender-related blogs.  It is in this way that they occupy space within a 
larger virtual community.  
 
 
                                                 
5 LiveJournal communities are designated with the  icon before its name and LiveJournal users are 
designated by the  icon before the username. 
 56 
4  
 
 
 
It must be on account of me being Not Trans Enough, or something. 
- auntysarah (LiveJournal, 2009k) 
 
 
 
As with sexuality, the nature vs. nurture debate is implicated in gender.  Is 
gender essential and biological or is it socially constructed?  Gender, after all, is 
given to be a social phenomenon, but it takes place through material means.  A 
social constructionist approach to gender critiques both biological research, as well 
as socialisation, that presumes a binary category of gender because knowledge 
claims regarding gender are socially produced through a discursive matrix that 
includes, for example, the medical sciences, disciplinary biases, and historically 
specific local cultural appropriations.  This chapter focuses on some discourses that 
produce a new in-community binary similar to the subversive queer/conservative 
gay and lesbian paradigm: subversive/conservative transgender. Again, it is 
important to note that the word transgender’s prominence grew from the perceived 
limits of transsexuality.  Is transsexuality (as a specific articulation of transgender) 
truly queer, then?  If queer theories insist that lived gender is a social construct 
separate from sex, why is there a feeling of being “in the wrong body” if lived and 
idealised gender is the focus of identity formation?  Does transsexuality reify 
hetero- and homo-sexuality and a binary gender at the cost of the proliferation of 
genders and sexualities? 
 
MAKING A SPACE ON THE TRANSWEB 
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While this project does not intend to be quantitative or make exhaustive 
knowledge claims on numbers, I have looked at some statistics of members of the   
transgender community to determine if any trends of note within the community 
emerged.  Over the one week period surveyed, a total of one hundred sixty (160) 
LiveJournal users posted in transgender across twenty-eight (28) individual 
community topics and four hundred seventy-six (476) posts.  Seventy-two users (45  
per cent) posted only once in the period surveyed.  Ten users posted in the 
community ten or more times, with a moderator, auntysarah, posting the most 
frequently (thirty-three times).  Of the one hundred sixty users who contributed to 
discussion, fifteen were considered frequent users, as they had posted, on average, 
once a day.  As these members maintain the community as a lively place for 
discussion, they are also perhaps more likely to be friended by members of the       
transgender community and linking to their own personal journals, to view on 
individuals’ friends page (and have influence on members outside of the  
transgender community) and may build relationships that aid in advice and  
knowledge  distribution.  And as members that maintain the community as a lively 
place for discussion, the may hold more influence on members’ constructions of 
knowledge claims.  By publishing knowledge claims online, such lay-experts’ 
subjective and anecdotal experiences can be transferred into valued knowledge 
(Orgad, 2005). 
 
 While less than half (37.2 per cent) of the community discussed their 
gender and/or sex status over the one week surveyed, the majority (79.4 per cent) 
made their status known through a combination of posts and their profiles, in which 
they have the option to write a short biography and list their interests.  All frequent 
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users made their statuses known either through posts or on their profiles.  The 
majority of users were transsexuals at varying points in their transitions, with only 
seven users discussing their bigender or non-gender reality, none of whom posted 
more than a few times.  Transmen were more prevalent in  transgender than 
transwomen, despite data that suggests transwomen outnumber transmen in 
Western cultures (for example, see Landén et al., 1996, which suggests a 
transwomen to transmen ratio of 3:1 across multiple countries), with possible 
exceptions being Serbia (Vujovic et al., 2009), where the ratio of transwomen to 
transmen is believed to be 1:1, and Poland  (Herman-Jeglińska et al., 2002), where 
the ratio of transwomen to transmen is believed to be almost 1:3.   
 
 
“We Can Always Use More Trannies!” 
The most active cisgender user was shmoo21, a student whose 
university’s Gay-Straight Alliance (GSA), of which she was the vice president, was 
working on a stage production of The Rocky Horror Picture Show (LiveJournal, 
2009o).  Her concern was that the president and “pretty much everyone else 
involved in the show” uses the word tranny: “‘You can be a random tranny in the 
background.’  ‘We can always use more trannies!’”  She admits she assumed the 
word was offensive, but as someone who is not transgender she was not certain, 
and when she approached her GSA she wanted to be sure her rationale for doing so 
was correct.  This polarised the transgender community for a number of reasons, 
including shmoo21’s very request for confirmation, the discrimination inherent 
in the word tranny, and the controversial reclamation of the word.   
masscooper:  Asking for education about a community in that 
community’s space is itself offensive.  Some folks 
may be glad to take the time to deal with you, but 
it’s no one’s job to do and is not really what this 
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community is here for.  …Now, of course, you’re 
likely to get a lot of feedback, and some of it will 
likely not be fun for you.  Because yes, that is an 
awful word, particularly when used by cis people 
about trans people.  But you knew that, right?  If 
you had read back you would know that for many 
trans women and a not insignificant number of 
trans men, it’s a word that is used to dehumanize 
and as a precursor to violence.  It’s not a fun word 
to have popping up on your friends page because 
someone can’t be bothered to read (not very) old 
posts in the community they’ve come to asking to 
be educated. 
 
When people ask questions like this, they often 
claim to be "just asking a question" and assert that 
they "can't learn if no one will tell [them]." When 
people get mad, justifiably, about posts in which a 
person such as yourself has come asking to be 
educated rather than doing some leg work, the OP6 
gets upset that people are "being mean" and 
flounces off, unscathed but all upset about their 
feelings being hurt. Meanwhile, they've triggered 
others and stirred up a community that has plenty 
enough to deal with already, but are able to be 
totally oblivious to the harm they've caused 
because of their cis privilege. 
 
martin_quin:   “Tranny” is offensive.  Very much so.  Some 
people are reclaiming it, but even that is 
controversial.  I for one would appreciate it if no 
one utters it at that event. 
 
kaedeko:   Tranny is a reclaimed word.  Some people still hate 
it, but acceptance and usage within the transgender 
community has gone up exponentially in the last 
five years or so. 
 
fall_of_sophia:  dubous, and irrelevant to a situation where cis 
people are using it. 
 
transpose:   If you're wanting to make your GSA a place that 
feels welcoming and safe to trans people, you 
should avoid using words that can be used to 
degrade them.  
 
Even if nobody who shows up is bothered by the 
word, and everyone feels that it's been reclaimed, I 
strongly suggest you air [sic] on the side of more-
respectful. Is using the word really worth having to 
try to explain to an upset newcomer that you "didn't 
mean it like that"?   
                                                 
6 original poster, the user that begins a discussion in transgender 
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parmonster:   It's at about the same level as "Faggot" IMO7. 
Partially reclaimed, but still loaded with negative 
connotations. 
 
I don't use "Faggot" in conversation or in reference 
to gay men because I'm not one and it's not my 
place to reclaim that word. I expect "Tranny" to be 
similarly unappropriated by cis people who are in 
no position to be reclaiming a word that doesn't 
belong to them. 
 
desiarcy:  To clarify as neutrally as possible, the reclamation 
of the term "tranny" is bitterly controversial within 
the trans community because its derogatory use is 
almost invariably against trans women, whereas 
most of the people who say that it has been 
reclaimed are trans men. Many trans women feel 
that trans men have no right to reclaim "tranny". 
 
dglenn:  Yah, basically this. Describing it as already-
reclaimed is premature and glosses over an in-
community ongoing controversy.  (ibid.) 
 
Linguistic reclamation, also known as linguistic resignification, is the use of 
a pejorative word by its targets as an act of resistance to its injurious power.  
Reclaiming a word is controversial, but is widely accepted by reclaimers as a right 
to self-define, in spite of – and in opposition to – marginalising discourses that 
would seem to control the pejorative nature of a word (Brontsema, 2004).  It is a 
Foucauldian reverse discourse that allows for the production of a new resistance 
and new discourses, for example queer’s critique of homonormativity, to be 
developed. While the reclamation of the word tranny may itself be a result of the 
queer revolution, the still contested reclamation of the word queer may give some 
insight. 
 
Queer’s origin in the Middle High German twer simply denoted anything 
not “normal.”  By the 20th Century its use in a sexual connotation was used almost 
                                                 
7 in my opinion 
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exclusively to describe male homosexual practices.  In terms of self-reference, 
historian George Chauncey (1994) complicates the notion of queer as referring to 
masculine homosexual men that considered themselves different from fairies, 
flamboyant and feminine homosexual men, before the Second World War.  Further 
to this, the queer-fairy distinction was not only based on notions of 
masculinity/femininity, but also expressed through class as well: most self-
identified queers were middle class and could experience significant professional 
sanctions if they were flamboyant.  Both queers and fairies, Chauncey explains, 
began to adopt the term gay in the 1920s as a safe word to denote homosexual 
desire.  Though originally adopted by fairies, queers eventually used gay as a code 
word for homosexuality, as it provided a knowing double meaning to homosexual 
men that could be safely used if one did not know another man’s sexual preference.  
According to Brontsema, by the Second World War gay had become the preferred 
term by homosexual youth, with queer’s traditional meaning of “abnormal” being 
seen as  pejorative and a reference to deviance. 
 
Queer experienced a rebirth in the early 1990s by youth who criticised gay 
and lesbian as limited – and limiting – identities and the use of (homo)sexuality as 
the foundation of these identities.  The first instance of queer reclamation came 
from the political group Queer Nation, which formed in 1990.  Queer Nation chose 
its name for its confrontational nature and its clear distancing from the 
essentialising and assimilationist natures of gay and lesbian, moving beyond the 
limits those terms place on the expression of both sexuality and gender and to 
include anything outside of the accepted range of “normal.”  Queer, then, is not 
simply a replacement for gay and lesbian, but a contestation of those terms that 
 62 
includes queer gays and lesbians, bisexuals, trans/bi/non-gender people, queer 
heterosexuals, fetishists, sadomasochists, etc.  As one of the most widely used 
pejoratives used against “sexual deviants,” queer was used by the Queer Nation to 
precisely highlight homophobia, a sociopolitical power play that attempts to 
separate the word from its violent past and render it neutral – or even positive. 
 
However, critics argue that the word queer is inseparable from its history of 
abuse and should not be used because any use is a repetition of hate.  To 
Brontsema, this view is largely adopted by older gays and lesbians, whose wounds 
are still fresh after a long history of the impact (both psychical and physical) of 
queer and therefore oppose its in-group use because those who identify as queer 
may have never had the word used against them.  To these critics, linguistic 
ownership is permanent: linguistic reclamation is not the depletion of power, in 
some verbal revolution, but its careless repetition.  For some queer theorists, it is 
this potentially inseparable quality that is precisely the need to reclaim queer; the 
word should be reclaimed by its targets and retain the stigma it holds.  Instead of it 
being a homophobic statement of one’s deviance, it is a badge of honour that 
questions the nature of what is deviant and what is normal.  As a critique of 
“normal,” queer necessarily needs to retain its stigma or it cannot confront the 
construction of “abnormal” and seek to position normalisation, instead of 
intolerance, as the site of violence against queer subjects. 
 
Tragically, queer as a political contestation of gay and lesbian within in-
group political projects is largely misunderstood or ignored by the out-group.  Non-
LGBT groups and the sexual mainstream often use the terms gay and lesbian and 
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queer interchangeably, with the latter often seen as hip and fashionable.  For 
example, queer’s purposeful gender inclusiveness, Brontsema notes, is largely 
ignored by popular media:   
Despite the claim that queer is gender-neutral, its use in popular television 
clearly associates it with male homosexuality.  The television program 
Queer as Folk focuses primarily on the lives of gay men, and Queer Eye for 
the Straight Guy has five pairs of ‘queer’ eyes – all belonging to gay men.  
There is nothing necessarily queer about these gay men… (ibid.: 13) 
 
Brontsema thus shows us that despite queer’s reappropriation and the in-group 
attempts to resignify the word, linguistic ownership is much more difficult to 
claim: queer is owned by all who use it and mainstream media holds a greater 
influence than a minority within a minority.  That the out-group claims a sort of 
reclamation of queer-as-chic is itself a problematic, which Jacinda Samuels (1999) 
blames on the queer’s gender-neutrality because it is based on a universal liberal 
subject that is claimed to be devoid of gender, race, and class. To her, the very 
elaboration of a queer subject is a liberal project: to move freely in and out of a 
fluid subject position presumes the liberty of an autonomous subject and both 
liberty and autonomy are constitutive of liberalism. 
Positioned rather precariously between the postmodern critique which 
spawned its creation, and the liberal strategies which it actively employs in 
an attempt to distinguish itself from its predecessors, the queer subject is 
subsequently constitutive not of a genuinely autonomous, anti-essentialist 
subject, but rather the unwitting reproduction of the very liberal humanist 
subject which it was originally intended to critique. (ibid.: 97) 
 
Further, she argues that the politics of reclaiming the word queer is facilitated 
through liberal premises inherent in the liberal tradition of terms such as gay and 
lesbian.   
 
Comparing the reclamation of queer to that of nigger/nigga amongst 
African-Americans, queer ownership can be claimed by the out-group because 
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queer assumes a universal liberal subject that is genderless, colourless, and 
sovereign, while nigger, a term that’s use also highly contested in-group amongst 
African-Americans, “always already signifies blackness” (ibid.: 102) and therefore 
does not model the liberal premises of equality, liberty, and autonomy; the 
reminder or race negates presumed equality.  Queer, on the other hand, can refer to 
both men and women (and is therefore gender-neutral) and all races (and is 
therefore race-neutral).   Thus, the liberal premises that underlie a queer 
subjectivity positions the queer subject as closer to the universal liberal subject 
than the racialised subject can be positioned.  This, Samuels argues, is the reason 
racial pejoratives continue to be taboo in the cultural mainstream and why we 
should not expect a sort of Nigga Eye for the White Guy.  However, Samuel ignores 
queer’s mainstream history that “always already signifies” sexuality and instead 
invokes a universal liberal subject that clearly does not have sexual intercourse, 
heterosexual or otherwise.  Because her notion of the universal liberal subject 
ignores its presumed heterosexuality, she does not position the queer subject as 
distant as the racialised subject. 
 
Similarly, transgender shows the word tranny has both an in-group battle 
for acceptance within the transgender community and an out-group careless use 
similar to queer.  Tranny received its mainstream use primarily through the 
ustilisation of the word in the sex industry as it fetishised and exoticised the 
transwoman’s body, presenting transsexual women and male transvestites as both 
not really women and sexually hungry like men, a kind of pathological erotics.  
Further popularised through pornography, tranny also framed transwomen as 
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sexual commodities.  The word has particularly targeted transwomen, who remain 
the most opposed to its reclamation. 
dglenn best describes the status of the word: describing it as already 
reclaimed, as other users had, is premature and ignores a far wider debate within 
the community, both online and offline.  What was almost universally agreed upon 
by the community is that whether or not it is reclaimed or reclaimable, no one 
outside of the transgender community should use the word the way queer is used in 
the cultural mainstream. 
 
What would the reclamation of tranny look like?  Of course, it would 
celebrate the diversity of those who experience cisgender oppression, to denote a 
politics of gender difference, but so can the word transgender.  Let us not forget 
transgender itself is queering of transsexual and is already a term that incorporates 
transsexuality and transvestism, so tranny would not emerge as a more inclusive 
term for trans subjectivities, especially as it may alienate, for example, intersexed 
subjectivities.  Queer was mostly successful because it is gender-neutral, and 
therefore a gender-inclusive, pejorative; it would be difficult to imagine women 
feeling part of a Faggot Nation or men part of a Dyke Nation.  But there are 
numerous queer alternatives to transgender: genderfucker, transgifted, and 
genderqueer, to name a few. 
 
 If tranny, or indeed any alternative to transgender, is to emerge as a 
generally accepted reclaimed word, it would be to expose the limits of transgender, 
to critique a normativity from which transgender suffers similar to the queer 
critiques of gay and lesbian as essentialist and assimilationist.  It would be a 
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project of unqueering transgender.  The rest of this chapter deals directly with 
normative notions within the transgender community. 
 
A Space for Critical Queer Ontology? Discourse as Violence 
David Valentine (2003), a non-transgender man, discussed the problematic 
of what is ethical when studying a transgender community.  He forwarded a draft 
of a paper he had submitted to Social Text to a transsexual friend who was 
beginning her transition.  In the subsequently published article (Valentine and 
Wilchins, 1997: 218), Valentine describes a seminar gender activist Riki Wilchins 
held in which she invited people to inspect her clitoris and describing hirself8 as 
“just your average, straight white guy with a cunt who really digs lezzie chicks like 
me.”  The friend responded with the following email: 
[…] I’ve been attacked by someone who calls themselves a male lesbian… 
If she defines the terms of the debate, then I want no part in the arguments.  
In that way, Riki’s words, Riki’s definitions rape me because they 
undermine the credibility of my take on myself and Wilchins has ‘power 
over’ me… And if Wilchins can rape me by having power over me, then 
Wilchins is indeed, very much a man.  Assertions can be violent and 
debilitating in that they make one size fit all. (ibid.: 218) 
 
Though his intentions of sending his friend a copy of his article were noble in 
gesture, the resulting critique demonstrates the ways in which research and the 
queer academy can commit an act of violence towards its subjects.  This further 
complicates my own research when I am a non-transgendered man observing a 
community that, though publicly available, is unaware of its observation within my 
project.  Yes, textual analysis is ethically safe and unobtrusive (Reinharz, 1992),  
but a recognition of my own privilege in studying an Other is important in feminist 
                                                 
8 Hir, zir, hirself, and zirself are terms frequently used by gender nonconformists as they are gender 
neutral. 
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debates, not to mention the fact that this project exposes transgender to the 
reader, who would have otherwise not been aware of its existence.   
 
Queer theorising has raised several issues in regard to identity categories 
and challenging these categories, itself privileging  theories of sexual and gender 
fluidity against essentialist, static identities.  My own critical epistemology itself is 
informed by a sort of “upmarket” theories from expensive universities and the 
queer/feminist intelligentsia.  I have had the opportunities to move from a gay-by-
praxis to a theorising queer, exposed to critiques as a critical queer scholar that 
might seem to undermine the comfortable systems whose margins I wish to 
understand.  While I recognise and am grateful for the political and social 
advancement of these oft-critiqued socially conservative gays, lesbians, and second 
wave feminists, it is easy – and perhaps important – to almost snide them of their 
limits as a critical queer feminist scholar, to give voice to the silent subalterns that 
gays and lesbians unwittingly create.  This often puts me at odds with members of 
my community.  But has – or even can – queer theories leave the academy and alter 
the public consciousness to create or reinvigorate a queer activism?  And do 
nonacademic members of the LGBT community see themselves as queer in the 
ways that queer theorists describe? 
 
Once again, referring to the use of tranny, is this following dialogue 
between kissberrywish, who according to her profile is a transwoman and a PhD 
student that focuses on queer and gender theories, and gymx, a gay transman. 
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kissberrywish:  you'll find a lot of college aged trans ppl9 rly10 dont 
find it offensive at all. so it depends, ask the trans 
ppl who are actually apart of your community and 
not ppl online who really don't interact on your 
campus and know what the vibe is there. i 
personally think its a dumb word but not rly 
offensive to my ~trans sensibilities~, i just equate it 
to being a hot mess so dont rly wanna be called that 
lol11. 
 
gymx:  Where the fuck are you getting the data to make 
this conclusion? 
 
kissberrywish:  lmao12 right because there's actual data on this and 
everyone in this bitch isnt speaking from personal 
experience alone, pleeeease. it isn't a conclusion its 
an OBSERVATION.  
idk13 why ppl are acting all "omg hdu14 suggest 
such an inplausable thing" when yall KNOW there 
are tons of trans ppl bouncing around self id-ing as 
trannies (and no i dont mean only trans guys) and 
using that word all the time like its nothing. i find 
the hyperbole in here suggesting every and all trans 
ppl loathe this word and that its never appropriate 
kinda bullshit. actually, complete bullshit. 
 
gymx:  I don't know this. I've never observed it. As far as 
I'm concerned it's a complete fabrication. So please, 
won't you provide something corroborate this 
observation of yours? Some statistics, say, showing 
that college-aged trans people self-refer as "tranny" 
significantly more than older trans people? If you 
make an outrageous claim like this, back it up or 
shut up. 
By the way, could you explain to me how what 
words trans people use in self-reference have any 
bearing on what words cis people use to refer to 
trans people? B/c15 really, your original comment 
was off-topic as well as inane. 
 
kissberrywish:  My data are friends and me and the dozens of trans 
ppl I hang out with and the more hundreds I 
associate with on a regular basis.  
Because many don't give a fuck if cis people use it 
either. It isn't the trans equivalent to racist/sexist 
terminology. We really don't care. 
                                                 
9 people 
10 really 
11 laugh out loud, a designation that something is humourous 
12 laugh my ass off, a designation that something is humorous 
13 I don’t know 
14 Oh my God, how dare you 
15 because 
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My comment my have been inane by your 
standards but your comment is pretty ridiculous and 
unnecessarily hostile, grow the fuck up plz16. 
 
gymx:   The plural of anecdote is not data.  
There's no other way to say this: you're 
stupefyingly ignorant. 
Then leave the conversation to the people who do 
[care]. 
 
kissberrywish:  Great argument! 
Oh but I do care about this discussion. If the OP 
(not you, a trans man whose place it really isnt to 
tell me, a trans woman, to fuck off on this 
discussion) doesn't wish to hear my opinion then 
I'll bounce. (LiveJournal, 2009o) 
 
 
kissberrywish’s own anecdotal experience resonates with my own, 
insofar as sexuality is concerned.  Undergraduates and postgraduates I have known 
who have taken Gender and Women’s Studies courses and/or had other access to 
queer theories (for example, in English) tended to have a different view of the 
“queer radical” than did students studying, say, business or Japanese.  Granted, 
these courses may have appealed to the interests of a more radical LGBT subject, 
but the academic pursuit of such theories did alter the understanding of some 
students’ self-identities.   
 
Political scientists Joe Rollins and H. N. Hirsch (2003: 291) ask, “Do 
academics and activists mean the same thing when they use the term queer?”  
Using the queer analogy again, does tranny have a more nuanced theoretical 
framework and meaning that the transgender mainstream might not catch?  Surely 
the theoretical splits that queer theories recognise, for example, essentialism/social 
construction, assimilation/liberation, raise important questions about strategies of 
                                                 
16 please 
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political engagement.  LGBT activism typically relies on an ontological reality that 
presumes a stable sexual identity that is individually and historically static, 
visibility, and that sexual minorities will gain acceptance through activism.  
However, its insistence on essentialism and focus on gay and lesbian politics has 
turned the “LGBTQ” community into the LG(BT)/Q dichotomy.  Rollins and 
Hirsch also suggest that self-defined queers are likely to be outside of the LGBT 
mainstream and are expected “to be younger, less affluent, less conventional, and 
more radical in their politics” than their nonqueer LGBT counterparts (ibid.: 295).  
Given that queer theories have had their greatest peak in the 90s, scholars of such 
theories will likely to be ever younger, less conventional, and more radical in their 
politics as queer theories develop.  While degree-earning, university-educated 
adults tend to be more affluent, a queer’s politics may marginalise them 
professionally. 
 
The intelligentsia/activism divide is nothing new for academics, especially 
those feminists and gay/lesbian scholars who helped to establish university 
departments of (Gender and) Women’s Studies and Gay and Lesbian Studies.  
Geographer Nicholas Blomley says academic activists are faced with conflicting 
responsibilities and difficult questions. 
These include personal questions of self-validation (who gives a damn 
about academic angst anyway?), institutional dilemmas (our status as 
highly paid professionals in a rapid proletarianizing world), and political or 
intellectual issues (what is our work supposed to do?). (Blomley, 1994: 
383, emphasis in original) 
 
He suspects more activism is not pursued by academics because activism is not 
seen as intellectual and is external to their professional academic work, as well as a 
“postmodern humility [that] cautions against speaking for the Other” (ibid.: 384). 
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 Indeed, geographers Duncan Fuller and Rob Kitchin suggest that the shift to 
postmodernism and poststructuralism has created “a political field in which justice 
and rights become slippery and relative” and undermines “organised resistance as 
they destabilise the very categories (e.g. class gender, race, sexuality) around which 
mobilisation might occur” (Fuller and Kitchin, 2004: 3).  They also suggest that the 
academy strategises to maintain its own authority as the university has made 
neoliberal shifts from learning institutions to knowledge businesses whose job 
market “breeds conformist and ‘safe’ research” (ibid.: 8). 
 
 Political scientists John Grundy and Miriam Smith suggest that there is 
discordance between queer scholarship and LGBT activism in that queer theoretical 
positions often compete with ontological politics of “real people” and the 
performative nature of LGBT social science “makes some queer realities real at the 
expense of others” (Grundy and Smith, 2007: 299), producing the social realities 
that are discovered.  Academic language is also “steeped in technical vocabularies 
that require years of training to fully understand” (Duggan, 2006c: 167); 
philosophical debates on what is just gay/lesbian and what is allowed to be counted 
as queer (illustrated earlier with Brontsema stating there is nothing queer about the 
gay men on Queer Eye for the Straight Guy) complicates the ability of academics 
to engage with the ontological politics of activism.   
 
Thus, kissberrywish’s response can be read as not just as a transwoman 
who is more affected by the history of the term tranny than gymx as a transman, 
it can also be read as a radical and critical queer academic that is being held 
accountable for her politics and placement in a privileged space of theory whilst 
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also being accountable to the transgender community, which may be conservative 
by comparison.  Indeed, tranny does not make reference to her ‘trans sensibilities’ 
and therefore she is not likely to take offense by its use and is perhaps more 
bothered by the insistence by other community members that it is offensive and not 
be used since “yall KNOW there are tons of trans ppl bouncing around self id-ing 
as trannies (and no i dont mean only trans guys) and using that word all the time 
like its nothing.”  For her, limiting the ability to self-identify as a tranny – 
especially if one is a transwoman – is an abuse of power by the larger transgender 
community, whose own ‘trans sensibilities’ would be offended by such an act.  To 
this, gymx’s reaction to what he considers an offensive word demonstrates the 
polarisation of the word’s queer usage.  
 
While the word tranny does not offend kissberrywish’s sensibilities, she 
does, however, associate the word with being a “hot mess,” and so she does not 
want to be called a tranny.  This in itself is a value statement, ironically coming 
from a queer scholar that epistemologically would celebrate the proliferation of 
queer ontologies, even those that can – and probably will – be seen as sloppy or 
tragically hopeless.  It implies that certain transgender performances are privileged 
at the expense of others, which suggests a normativity within gender transgression. 
 
However, we should not assume the non-academic/academic or practical 
gay/theorising queer divide is devastated by Sullivan’s notion of postmodern 
“apolitical politics,” as Rollins and Hirsch note that those who identify as queer in 
their survey still supported the LGBT inclusion in institutions such as marriage and 
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the military since their very participation in these institutions is itself a radical 
move.  Geographer Don Mitchell also notes that 
a commitment to radical scholarship requires making a commitment to 
something postmodernism simply cannot make a commitment to: truth. 
There are most certainly truths, as best we can know them at this time and in 
this place, and as conditioned as they may be by our limited ways of knowing 
and vantage points. And it is only by revealing these truths – of exploitation 
and oppression, or more accurately of systemic exploitation and oppression, 
of inequity and the unfair workings of power – and showing why they matter 
to people that a real commitment to radical, progressive, and revolutionary 
change can be made. This means making a commitment to real, live human 
beings, not to ‘subjects’, not just to ‘bodies’, not to radically decentred 
psyches, but to people, with thoughts and feelings, loves, needs, desires, and 
dreams, and (maybe) with jobs and mortgages and trouble meeting their 
monthly bills, staving off the sexual advances of a supervisor or coworker, or 
getting their child a decent education despite deeply racist, regressive school-
funding systems. (Mitchell, 2004: 28, emphases in original) 
 
For Mitchell, radical scholarship must identify inequalities, but must also be allowed 
to be strategically used to work with the truths that ontological politics require for 
mobilisation.  Indeed, in the preface of the 1999 edition of Gender Trouble, Butler 
remarks that the mobilisation of identity for the purposes of politics remains 
problematic due to identity being an effect of power, but it is no reason not to “use, 
and be used by identity” (xxvii).  In this sense, we can strategically accept a 
broader LGBTQ identity to position our politics because “some identities have 
been recuperable for political agency” (Hoad, 2007: 515).  It is therefore important 
to understand the lived truths of transgender experiences. 
 
The Transsexual Patient 
The medical sciences carry a great weight in terms of people thinking about 
their bodies, identities, social practices, and mental health.  This is especially the 
case for transsexuals, who must undergo gatekeeping psychological diagnoses 
before undergoing prescribed biomedical interventions to change the body, which 
typically begins with a cycle of hormones, followed by further diagnostic care, and, 
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if chosen by the patient and accepted by medical professionals, sex reassignment 
surgery (SRS).  This process allows biomedicine to treat the pathological and 
ensure a healthy outcome; in other words, sex reassignment can be a treatment for 
gender identity disorder, to ensure ambiguous bodies are less so. 
 
Though the transperson has been theorised as an ideal queer subject, the 
transsexual problematises this notion of a fluid gender, as their own gender is 
thought of in essentialist terms.   I argue that “wrong body” discourses produce 
transsexuals as their effects, mitigated by medical techniques to fix the body as 
appropriate to one of only two sexes.  For example, neuroscientists Mikael Landén, 
Jan Wålinder, and Bengt Lundström (1996) found transsexuality to be exclusively 
neurobiological and therefore can be treated through biomedical interventions.  
This has reified a body/mind dichotomy in which the mind is wholly separate from 
the body.  Rather than self-identifying as “a woman with a penis,” wrong body 
discourses, dispersed through the hegemony of medicine, allow one to identify as 
“a woman in a man’s body” and can subsequently be treated.  
 
Intervention and bodily change therefore become necessary for transsexuals 
for their identity and mental health, part of the transsexual narrative whose terms of 
reference are informed by medicine.  creme_fraiche had been administering 
testosterone from illegal, unregulated sources for years prior to proper medical 
care.  He did not condone this potentially dangerous approach, but it “was 
necessary for my sanity at the time” (LiveJournal, 2009h). 
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In fact, many of the posts were users seeking advice about hormone 
replacement therapy (HRT).  A number of users were pre-transition or at the start 
of their transitions and wanted information from people who experienced HRT 
firsthand.  The wealth of knowledge regarding the biology of different hormone 
drugs was astounding and it was not surprising that many participants in the 
Human Rights Commission’s To Be Who I Am: Report of the Inquiry into 
Discrimination Experienced by Transgender People found they knew more than 
their doctors.  After meeting with hir endocrinologist, didactic_cudgel began a 
discussion on HRT (LiveJournal, 2009l): 
didactic_cudgel: During my feminization HRT, I would like to retain 
my sexual function, I would like to reduce the 
hormones I’m on to maintain a bigendered body 
(for lack of a better descriptor – it fits my Gender 
Identity, but I’m not sure it applies to physical bits 
as well) and I would like to be able to obtain and 
maintain erections. 
 I know most MTF-spectrum people are heading 
towards SRS, which is not my goal, but I was 
wondering if anyone has used Lupron for any 
significant time and/or has stoppped using it and 
what zir sexual function has been. 
 
baglieg: All the t-girls I know use spiro or androcur.  Taking 
lurpon is unusual for adult trans people. 
However, I have heard of lurpon being used to 
delay puberty in both FtM and MtF children. 
 
auntysarah: I can talk about my experience on Zoladex, which 
is a GnRH agonist depo like Lupron.  As I 
understand it, the effects of the two drugs are 
similar, but Lupron is a slightly older drug. 
Mileage will obviously vary, but the Zoladex did 
seem to have quite an atrophying effect on my 
penis.  I could still get erection, up until the point I 
had SRS, but after a few months on Zolade they 
hurt. 
Maintaining sexual/erectile function whilst 
feminising is something of a tightrope act, and 
while everyone’s experiences will likely differ, it 
may be that you want to investigate not using an 
antiandrogen at all, and see how that goes. 
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didactic_cudgel: This definitely sounds like something I want to 
avoid. 
 
Later, didactic_cudgel began another discussion about hir visit to the 
endocrinologist (LiveJournal, 2009n). 
 
didactic_cudgel: I saw the endo today and it was not as smooth as I 
would have liked. 
Her initial questions made it clear that she believed 
me to be on the standard TS SOC17 path, so I had to 
stop her to explain that I didn't want SRS and that I 
am not a transsexual. She was quite confused by 
the statement and I had to explain that I identify as 
both male and female at once. She became 
somewhat ... confrontational, I guess. I had a very 
difficult time explaining how I felt, because I was 
so thrown off by her somewhat antagonistic tone.  
"Normally, this treatment is for someone who 
wishes to live full-time as a woman, for a period of 
a year or so and then have gender reassignment 
surgery."  
"I know this," I said, "but that is not my goal. I 
simply want my body to match my brain. It feels 
incomplete to me." 
"Perhaps your desire to express your femininity 
would be better served through cross-dressing or 
getting a push-up bra?"  
I told her that I'd been cross-dressing since I was 
five and that it wasn't cutting it. "As I told my 
therapist, I'd rather be a feminine bigendered 
person who has to work at passing as male than a 
masculine bigendered person who has to work at 
passing as female." 
She did order blood-work and told me to schedule 
another appointment in two weeks, but at the last 
minute, changed her mind and added a karyotype in 
addition to a CBC, liver enzyme panel, testosterone 
level and estradiol level she had already ordered 
and amended it to one month out. I went to the 
blood draw, scheduled the appointment for Sept. 
25th and left. I wonder if she thinks I have a 
genetic abnormality causing my bigendered 
identity. Seems dubious... 
 
ranka: I have no personal experience, but it doesn't really 
surprise me. Most people have a very binary view 
of gender, so the idea of someone wanting to be 
something other than fully male or fully female is 
perplexing to a lot of people. 
                                                 
17 stream of consciousness 
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baglieg: Yeah, it’s easier to get hormones if you let them 
think that you see yourself as a woman and intend 
to get surgery.  A lot of them don’t understand 
anything else. 
 
ellyrouge: I had a quite similar experience, although not that 
"far", because I told my endocrinologist that I 
wanted to "feminize my body" and he was like 
"uugh, but those treatment is not for people who 
want to be more feminine, it's for people who know 
they are women since they are 2 and want to go all 
the way" 
And he went on explaining to me what 
transsexuality was, cause he knew better of course. 
But I stepped back and said "yes, that's what I 
mean", even though it was a lie (I didn't define as 
woman and didn't want surgery). 
 
mercurychaos: My doctor who prescribes me T is amazing and I 
really like her, but I am still not going to tell her 
details about my identity (or my sex life, unless it's 
relevant), because she simply does not need to 
know those things - all she needs to know is that 
I've seen a therapist, who has cleared me to begin 
HRT, and I need that prescription now please. 
(ibid.) 
 
Online communication with a lay-expert regarding treatment options has 
the potential to challenge traditional doctor-patient relations.  Being able to post hir 
experience online and initiate discussion is one way that hir can challenge 
impersonal medical discourses.  The cissexim of didactic_cudgel’s 
endocrinologist reiterates Foucault’s notion of biopower, the process through 
which dominant discourses of medico-transsexuality operate.  After the 
gatekeeping process of seeking a psychological evaluation prior to bodily changes 
(“all she needs to know is that I've seen a therapist, who has cleared me to begin 
HRT…”), didactic_cudgel now faces a new regulatory body: a medical 
professional that is confused by hir desire to be neither wholly male nor wholly 
female.  Describing hir plans to be a third gender in a two-gender system, hir 
endocrinologist suggests cross-dressing may satisfy hir desire.  The problem lies in 
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the fact that the patient’s planned outcome is that which is still “pathological”: 
HRT (leading to presumed SRS) cannot “cure” hir of hir gender dysphoria and 
give hir the female body that neatly reifies the gender binary.  In short, hir is 
encouraged to lie or mislead hir endocrinologist to believe hir is a more 
appropriate hormone-treatable patient, to fit into the endocrinologist’s frame of 
reference. 
 
 didactic_cudgel experiences a multipersonalisation quite unlike the 
depersonalisation that transsexuals feel and is part of the Gender Identity Disorder 
diagnosis.  isee_spots initiated a discussion of her feelings of depersonalisation, 
of feeling detached from and in the wrong body (LiveJournal, 2009k).  Eleven 
users described similar feelings they encountered before they began their 
transitions and assured isee_spots that it is common for transsexuals. 
vlmitchell: As with the others, yes this is how most of us 
have felt at one time or another, myself being a 
somewhat extreme example (schizo crap 
materialized here). Some of us knew that we 
were GID (or some approximation of the idea) 
and some didn't. This is a general symptom of 
dysphoria in general and not necessarily 
GENDER dysphoria. If you think you might 
need to talk to someone, you'll be best served 
going to a regular therapist who also does GID 
work at first to find out whether or not you need 
to look further into this. (ibid.) 
  
vlmitchell’s response exposes the essentialist, prediscursive nature of 
transsexuality.  Widely believed to have a biological and universal basis, 
transsexuality begins to expose itself as an essentialist identity, supported by 
overwhelming (positivist) medical evidence, and that gender variance is legitimate 
and treatable.  The transsexual will experience a sort of dysphoria, which can later 
be diagnosed and treated through various methods, which, as we have seen with   
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didactic_cudgel’s endocrinologist, can be quite biased and limiting.  Again, the 
body/mind dichotomy is a recurring trend in discussions: 
haviomally: We are not changing our soul, just our bodies so 
they can align with our mind. (LiveJournal, 2009f) 
 
keiboy: I guess we’ve just come to realize that if it can be 
so wrong from the day we were born then it’s not 
just a big thing, because in our eyes, we know who 
we are. (LiveJournal, 2009h) 
 
hj1002: When the hell will people realize transgenderism is 
as biological as sexuality?! (LiveJournal, 2009q) 
 
syvilan: I can’t tell them the reason we can’t see eye to eye 
is my forbidden secret: My feminine personality. 
(LiveJournal, 2009u) 
 
vlmitchell: I sincerely hope you are not limiting your options 
based on either financial or geographic notions.  
Both can be changed at the drop of a hat, should 
you be motivated enough to seek your happiness. 
(ibid.) 
 
 
Again, we see the effects of wrong body discourses: a “feminine 
personality” trapped in a male body and the pursuit of happiness and fulfilment 
that comes with having a body congruent with the mind.  What comes from this is 
a strategic politics based on a biological model, devoid of choice, and since 
transsexuals did not choose to be in their predicament, they should have access to 
taken-for-granted cisgender rights and privileges.  As a result, transsexuals wish to 
be accepted for who they care and to get on with their lives. 
 
Don’t Be a Hot Mess 
 The act of “passing” allows the transitioned transsexual to do just that: to 
more or less carry on with his or her life.  Passing is a concealment strategy 
because it allows the body to be read as the transsexual’s preferred, lived gender 
and thus gains and sustains mainstream inclusion (Bell and Binnie, 2000). 
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Ultimately, realness is the transsexual condition (Halberstam, 2001).  kesnit is a 
first-year law student and his university sends out a weekly email about student 
organisations meetings.  The morning of his post, he was sent an email about a 
meeting for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender students at a local pizzeria as an 
informal meet and greet for new students.   
kesnit: I pass very well as male.  My legal name is still my 
(female) birth name, but I am in the process of 
changing it and when I introduce myself, I use my 
chosen name.  I identify as a straight man.  I plan to 
live stealth as much as possible. (LiveJournal, 
2009c) 
 
He is undecided about going to the social, as he does not want to come out. Instead, 
he wishes to hide his trans status, which he could do successfully since he passes as 
male.  However, he also notes it would be a good way of meeting someone who 
can point him in the direction of a trans friendly endocrinologist.  He began the 
discussion on transgender for advice.   
creme_fraiche: My partner is also a law student, and I can tell you 
by observing her experience that law school is a 
strange environment in terms of social interactions.  
There tends to be a lot of emphasis on public image 
because people tend to look at every social event as 
a potential professional networking opportunity. 
 If it’s a higher priority for you to make sure that 
your future colleagues and potential employers do 
not have that information about your history, I’d 
recommend seeking out trans community support 
outside of your law school.  
 
masscooper: I would not trust in members of an LGB(T) campus 
org to keep someone’s trans status a private matter.  
Not only are their many gay and lesbian people 
likely not to understand why your trans status is a 
private matter, there’s also the fact that law school 
can be very cut-throat, and if you are hoping to be 
stealth, you don’t want to give this information to 
people who will be competing with you for jobs. 
(ibid.) 
 
Though he passes well enough as male, creme_fraiche and masscooper 
confirm his fears that he could be eventually outed, by either his very attendance or 
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because his profession is “cut-throat.”  Outed as a transsexual, he might lose some 
privileges gained through the successful passing as a cisgender male, subjecting 
him to hostile situations and violence. 
 
 For passing to be successful, the subject must not only perform their gender 
correctly, but their corporeality must be read as unambiguous, hence the desire for 
HRT, even when administered illegally and without a doctor’s support.  But to 
critics, passing reifies binary systems: the sexed body is either male or female and 
the lived gender is either masculine or feminine.  In opposition, a public queer 
identity consists of an “active or wilful negation of passing” (Schlossberg, 2001: 3) 
and passing “threatens to call attention to the performative and contingent nature of 
all seemingly ‘natural’ or ‘obvious’ identities” (ibid.: 2).  Passing is conservative 
by nature and reaffirms various social hierarchies because passing is a mimesis, the 
art of appropriating power by imitating it (for example, is it the intention or desire 
of transsexual subjects to undermine patriarchy and heteronormative notions of 
gender and sex or is their desire to just feel right in their own bodies?).  On the 
other hand, queer politics seek to celebrate difference rather than having 
transgender sexual bodies pass into a comfortable invisibility. 
 
 The majority of passing, I would argue, can be described by communication 
theorist Charles E Morris III’s (2005) notion of “passing by proxy,” which is the 
acceptance of an open secret, a supposedly ignorant silence performed with a 
knowing wink.  It is a practice undertaken by both the one who wishes the pass and 
the one(s) that will allow them to pass, despite the obvious: I came out, but we 
don’t really talk about it, or, How could my mother not know I was gay!  And 
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silence itself is discursive, as “difference in a closet culture is a collusive, open 
secret.  By this I mean more than varying degrees of knowledge that ‘it’ exists” 
(ibid.: 267).  The silent feature of ignorance can therefore satisfy heteronormative 
expectations and erase any contestations even in the face of those very 
contestations, and “if only straights could keep their mouths shut, this artful 
silencing might be complete” (ibid.). 
  
 In one post, keiboy, a married FtM who is now transitioning, wrote, “I 
pretty much have realized that I’ll never get surgery as long as I’m with [my 
husband] and I’ve come to accept that.  We’ve talked about it off and on and come 
to the conclusion that this is just something that is one move at a time” 
(LiveJournal, 2009i).  Prior to any surgery, his Mormon husband can feign 
ignorance as long as his wife, who he presumed was cisgender when they married, 
does not break this silence with, for example, his postoperative penis.  Instead,               
keiboy has accepted that surgery is not an option because this silence protects his 
husband’s sensibilities; He can ignore his wife’s queerness only up to a point.  
Another discussion was initiated by glazedlife to ask if any MtF transsexuals that 
have not undergone SRS have any “wonderful stories of meeting a guy that was 
completely straight” and aware of the users’ trans status (LiveJournal, 2009z).  A 
few FtM weighed in on their experiences and the only MtF users at first were 
lesbian transwomen.  fall_of_sophia offered her rationale for this as follows: 
queer female sexuality isn't quite as prone to being "threatened" by 
attraction to/dating a trans woman as male heterosexuality most of the time. 
not to say that cis guys who are secure enough with themselves don't exist 
(they do), and that there aren't plenty of cis lesbians who will freak the fuck 
out and have an identity crisis (there are), but this is something general 
about how heterosexuality is constructed. (ibid.) 
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According to fall_of_sophia, women are generally more accepting of queer 
bodies, even though some women, such as a cis lesbian, would feel “threatened” by 
a transwoman, and this is primarily because of notions of male heterosexuality and 
heteromasculinity.  This is not to suggest transwomen can never have a “wonderful 
story” with a straight cisgender man, as there are “cis guys who are secure enough 
with themselves.” parmonster added,  
[No straight cisgender male lovers] pre-op, but I've dated (and slept with) a 
cis man after surgery and he really didn't blink an eye over where my 
genitals came from. I *think* he's the sort to have been able to work around 
pre-op bits, but I guess we'll never know. fwiw18, this guy is Dutch, and 
they tend to have...less prudish views of sex than American men. 
Everyone else I've been involved with has been queer to one degree or 
another (trans, bi, and/or lesbian). (ibid.) 
 
 However, passing by proxy’s will to ignorance is not complete. If body and 
performance are read as (too) incongruent, the transgender, whether transsexual or 
genderqueering, may be positioned within a site of violence, especially if it a threat 
to one’s heteromasculinity.  Indeed, fall_of_sophia may be on to something 
about how male homosexuality is structured since most transphobic violence is 
perpetrated by heterosexual cisgender men. 
 
Violence as Consciousness-Raising 
 On 26 August 2009 at 2:33PM, police and ambulatory services responded to 
a report of an assault outside of 209 Q Street in Washington DC.  They found two 
transwomen with multiple stab wounds. One, Tyli’a “Na Na Boo” Mack, was sent 
to Howard University Hospital and was pronounced dead at 3:02PM.  (Hess, 2009)  
As of this writing, the police, who are exploring the possibility of this attack as a 
hate crime, are still investigating.  mindtheft notified the community that 
                                                 
18 for what it’s worth 
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Transgender Health Empowerment, Inc was organising a candlelight vigil for the 
victim.    
shrines: i'm almost for sure going to be at the vigil, i'm not 
far at all from the 200 block of q. this is horrible - 
in the MIDDLE OF THE DAMN DAY. ugh ugh 
ugh. 
 
gennee: I read about it this morning. A horrible crime 
indeed. I can only imagine what the family is going 
through. I pray many will come t the vigil in a 
show of support. 
 
hj1002: What the fuck is wrong with people. Daytime? 
That's downright chilling. (LiveJournal, 2009q) 
 
For shrines and hj1002 the crime is doubly disturbing as not only is it a 
horrific example of violence against other transgender people, but that it happened 
boldly and in broad day light.  This reiterates the violence that all transgendered 
people face when the body and performed gender are read as incongruence.  This is 
easily illustrated by sylvian: “I consider myself to be as feminized as I can 
without being endangered by transphobia” (LiveJournal, 2009u). 
 
However, I do not wish to mistake violence as merely physical.  Attempts to 
humiliate and out transgender individuals are just as devastating to one’s psychical 
form as a knife is to one’s physical form.  hockeyraven posted a link to a blog 
from Weird Universe (2009) that was written about Caster Semenya, a champion 
South African runner whose “manliness” resulted in calls for her gender-testing 
(LiveJournal, 2009g).  Hir noted that the blog’s comments had taken a transphobic 
turn and hir wanted to express in the comments that the word tranny is offensive, 
but felt hir could not articulate the argument well enough.  First the article from 
Weird Universe: 
 
 85 
The Subtleties of Gender 
"Extremely complex" is how a world amateur athletics spokesman 
described gender verification testing (commenting on the suspicions raised 
about the champion South African runner Caster Semenya, who is, said 
her daddy, his "little girl," even though she appears to some like daddy's 
little boy). Complex? Hey, just pull her pants down, huh?. Or measure her 
androgen and estrogen levels? Or see if she's got a Y? Well . . no. For 
athletic-unfairness purposes, those things are indicators but aren't 
conclusive. Some genitalia are actually in conflict or inactive, and 
anyway, it's not the dick itself that improves female athletes' performance. 
It's the hormones, but men can still tilt high on estrogen and women tilt 
high on androgen. Even the chromosome thing doesn't always work out 
right. And the hormone deal, itself, gets you into a gray area because so 
much of superior performance emanates from the body one acquires at 
birth. World-class athletes are (and I use the term lovingly) freaks of 
nature, as are sexually-confused transgenders. [On the other hand, just 
because I'm sympathetic doesn't mean I'm necessarily for letting trannies 
decide, all to themselves, which restroom they're gonna pee in.] (ibid., 
italics in original) 
 
It does not particularly seem as if any comments took a transphobic turn, as the 
transphobia began with the blog itself as the blogger “lovingly” refers to “sexually-
confused transgenders” as freaks and trannies and does not want a tranny in his 
bathroom, not to mention the fact that this news is clearly considered weird enough 
to post on a blog called Weird Universe.  The comments from readers are typical of 
what one would expect.  Some community advice: 
auntysarah: Sarah's first rule of "Trans stories on the Internet" - 
never read the comments, they will most likely rob 
you of your will to live, and make you cry. :-( 
 
 
The Semenya case made worldwide headlines, making something private 
(and, at most, a sport-wide issue) a global, public soap opera.  Improvements in her 
running led the International Association of Athletics Foundation (IAAF) to test 
Semenya for both drugs and genetic sex.  Feeling “humiliated” and “like a leper,” 
she almost boycotted the medal ceremony and told the president of Athletic South 
Africa, “No one ever said I was not a girl but here I am not.  I am not a boy!  
…Why did you bring me here?  You should have left me in my village at home” 
(BBC News, 2009). 
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These were not the only reference to recent headlines in transgender.  
There was a discussion on the transgender anarchist Ariel Attack, who was 
suspected in being involved in vandalising the Democratic Party’s headquarters in 
Colorado (LiveJournal, 2009t).  From the original article: 
DENVER — The suspect arrested Tuesday morning on charges of 
smashing 11 windows at the state Democratic Party headquarters is a 
transgendered “Denver-based anarchist” who goes by the name “Ariel 
Attack,” according to postings on numerous anarchist and radical gay-
rights websites. A fundraising plea circulated by the self-described “radical 
queer group” Denver Bash Back! seeks donations to raise the $5,000 bail 
set for 24-year-old Maurice Schwenkler… 
 
The postings asked “people to NOT call the jail and potentially out Ariel, 
which would create a very dangerous situation,” noting that “Jail is a 
dangerous place for everyone, but especially trans people.” (Colorado 
Independent, 2009, italics mine) 
 
transgender users showed both support for Ariel and a condemnation of her as a 
criminal.  There was some discussion on the outing of her by the newspaper: 
 
zanyassmask: well the bigger issue, i think, is why this newspaper 
felt the need to out this person while 
simultaneously repeating the info that it could be 
dangerous to out them. i'm not sure why the 
person's trans status means anything to the outside 
world--it's a lazy reporter that justifies something's 
newsworthiness simply on the basis that 'other 
people are discussing it' 
 
pandalicious: My dad mentioned something along these lines. 
Why was it important that she was a transwoman? 
It just reinforces the "need" to put someone's "real" 
gender on paper, as if to say, "Haha, you can't fool 
us." :\ 
 
shadowchild: Yeah, it was wondering the same thing. "Don't call 
the jail it could be dangerous for her - oh, btw, here 
have a pic and her full name!" Um.... 
(LiveJournal, 2009t).   
 
The Colorado Independent shows reckless disregard to Ariel’s safety as it posts her 
name immediately before noting calls to not out Ariel as jail can be dangerous 
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especially for transpeople.  While outing can obviously be dangerous for Ariel, the 
act of coming out and keeping the personal private is representative of 
assimilationist discourses and the LGBT community.  Ariel would eventually have 
the felony charges against her lifted, ordered to pay a fine of US$5,600, and be 
sentenced to a year of unsupervised probation. 
  
 The discussions on violence have the transformative potential of affecting 
users offline through its consciousness-raising power. The process known as 
consciousness-raising is meant to encourage social change as the product of “re-
thinking the relationship between social and political structure and human agency – 
in other words, social change brought about through mass individual change” 
(Stanley, 1993: 44).  Offline personal truth can coincide with an online shared 
imagination to prove an avenue for consciousness-raising and political action 
(Portelli 1998).  While discussions are framed as individual experience, they 
mediate a sense of community, belonging, and commonality. 
 
 Communication scholar Tasha N. Dubriwny (2005: 397) explains that 
collective rhetoric “should have the scope to explain the ways in which new 
vocabularies take form” through the interaction of individuals.  Interaction within 
transgender can therefore be thought of as a collective rhetoric.  If collective 
rhetoric can develop into collective persuasion, it has the potential to create a 
consciousness-raising paradigm.  Dubriwny positions consciousness-raising as 
originating in second wave feminism when “consciousness-raising groups rejected 
the traditional concepts of the rhetorical process” (ibid.: 400) and demonstrated the 
necessity of legitimising individual and collective experiences as a political tool.  
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Individual action thus creates a larger collective narrative.  However, this 
experience of collective narration is not limited to news stories, of course, but 
includes the entirety of all individual narratives. 
  
 Consciousness-raising is effective because “each subject position holds a 
partial knowledge” (Montenegro, 2002: 512) and so a collective rhetoric is the 
coalescence of all subject knowledges to achieve what is believed to be a more total 
understanding of “the ideological conceptions concealing reality” (ibid.: 513).  
Through consciousness-raising and political action, transgender groups can engage 
the cultural mainstream and expose the ways in which taken for granted notions of 
gender (generally) and transgender (specifically) are understood and to confront the 
conditions of oppression that are produced through this taken-for-grantedness.   
 
 transgender provides a virtual space for transpeople to discuss trans 
issues, which partly explains masscooper’s reaction toward cisgender                    
shmoo21’s post about the word tranny.  Further to this, the invisibility of trans 
issues in the cultural mainstream has framed transgender narratives as isolated and 
individual.  Online interaction can facilitate publicity of issues that might otherwise 
remain peripheral.  For example, immortal_lights beginning a discussion on a 
call for narratives to support the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(LiveJournal, 2009e).   
 
Thinking Transnormativity 
 Gay and lesbian historian Lisa Duggan coined the word homonormative to 
describe what she saw as the neoliberal shift towards a mainstream gay and lesbian 
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centre critical of extremist views on the far Right and far Left that resulted in a new 
gay/lesbian paradigm informed by AIDS activism and militant queer nationalism 
(demonstrated by ACT UP and Queer Nation) in the 1980s: 
Alongside radical and progressive AIDS activism a new strain of gay 
moralism appeared – attacks on “promiscuity” and the “gay lifestyle” 
accompanied advocacy of monogamous marriage as a responsible disease-
prevention strategy.  In this fertile ground, the coterie of writers attached to 
the [Independent Gay Forum] began to spread the word about their new gay 
politics – a politics that offers a dramatically shrunken public sphere and a 
narrow zone of “responsible” domestic privacy, in terms arguably more 
broadly antidemocratic and antiegalitatrian than the homophile movement 
at its most cautious and assimilationist. (Duggan, 2002: 182) 
 
Piggybacking off the liberal and nationalist politics of equal “rights” for a 
“minority” and the end of discrimination, this new political shift used the familiar 
language within public discourse to negotiate a space between the conservative and 
religious Right and liberal centre-left politics.  This homonormativity is a politics 
that does not condemn or seek to destabilise heternormativity as a now villainised 
queer Left advocates, but rather upholds most of its structures, privileging 
monogamy, private/domestic sexuality, gender normative performances, and 
patriotism, to name just a few.  Certain articulations of homosexuality are rendered 
appropriate while others are framed as ridiculous and shameful: If homosexuality’s 
far Left would just disappear, heterosexuals would see we normal gays really are 
just like them.   
 
The discussion of Ariel Attack is also useful for representing several points 
in this chapter.  She has written blogs for the radical Queers Against Obama 
(www.queersagainstobama.org, which frequently uses the word tranny with pride) 
to which her queer politics were called “insane” ( contrariwiseone) and “stupid” 
( whisperkit), demonstrating the polarising nature radical queer politics and queer 
theorising can have on conservative transpeople; her genderqueering, 
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nondetermination to pass, and anarchist politics becomes conflated with queer 
ridiculousness and extremist Left terrorism.  And while she wants her body to be 
read as in between, this leaves her open to very real violence, especially when 
public discourses name hir as transgender.  Morris’ notion of passing by proxy, 
which he based on newspapers not explicitly referring to murderous lovers Richard 
Loeb and Nathan Leopold as homosexuals (though the public knew the sordid 
details) does not work for Ariel because her politics refuse to be silenced, to be kept 
a secret: her radical queerness is detailed in a growing tabloid culture. 
  
 In this chapter I sought to achieve a discussion on the normative nature of 
some articulations of transgender as produced in the way that the assimilationist 
agenda of some gays and lesbians expose the homonormative and value-laden 
hierarchy of queer citizenship.  The discussion of essentialist identity, physical 
bodies, and conservativism in the transgender online community does suggest a 
privileging of certain articulations and practices, a normativity within the 
transgender identities: a transnormativity.  This transnormativity is a conservative 
politics that creates new binaries for transpeople: 
passing incongruent body and gender 
stealth obvious 
respectability looking like a “hot mess” 
in the wrong body genderplay with my body 
trans status is biological trans status is constructed 
static gender fluid gender 
tranny is offensive tranny has subversive potential 
 
The desire to pass is not only an issue of the vulnerability of public readings of the 
body and gender, but a privileging that exposes gender nonconformists can threaten 
the transsexual passing project.  And so certain articulations of transgender prefer 
to be stealth, to pass completely or by proxy, and live in the cisgender mainstream.  
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Nonconformist transpeople, the hot messes of the trans world, pose a danger to the 
respectable transpeople who reify a dichotomous nature of both sex and gender and 
did not choose to “be born this way.” 
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5  
BORROWED SPACE AND TRANSPHOBIC FEMINISM ON FEMINISTING.COM 
 
 
 
Imagine that you’ve just met a new group of friends. At first, they seem 
nice and share a number of interests in common with you. Your friends 
decide to throw a party each month at one of their houses. They decorate 
the house, decide what food to serve, and choose the music. You politely 
ask if you might help out in some of these tasks and the response you get 
is, “Well… OK.” Admittedly, their response is a little lukewarm, but you 
really like them, so you dismiss the response as a fluke and continue to 
hang out with them. After a few months, you begin to notice a pattern. 
Somehow, the house always manages to be decorated before you arrive 
to help. The food you bring always seems to be shoved to the back of the 
buffet table, behind other dishes, or worse: it gets put into the refrigerator 
without being served. Whenever you make a suggestion for the music, it 
gets ignored, or someone turns it off after people complain about how 
horrible it is. At one party, you accidentally overhear several of your 
friends laughing at how outlandish your tastes and interests are. After a 
while, you’re feeling pretty hurt. You explain to your friends that you 
feel excluded. Some of your friends tell you that you’re imagining things. 
A few others, responding in anger, inform you that you are a 
troublemaker and ask you to pipe down or leave. …This is what it feels 
like to be a trans woman in many feminist spaces. 
  -timberwraith, Feministing.com  
 
 
 
 If transgender subjects already hold a precarious relationship with the gay 
and lesbian machinery of social politics, their position within some feminist 
theories and praxes is no more comfortable.  This may seem surprising given 
feminism’s third wave, which embraces contradiction, multiplicities, and 
individuality.  With its roots in women of colour insisting that “woman” is only one 
of their many (oppressed) identities, feminist scholar Jennifer Gilley suggested that 
“the third wave’s insistence on the ability to embrace contradiction, and its refusal 
to fit into neat categories, makes it the perfect home for a new theory of 
transgenderism” since “postmodern feminist theory has deconstructed the category 
of “woman” to the point where it can barely be said to exist” (2005: 190).  Further 
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to this, she suggests that the experiences leading women, and men, to the third 
wave are different from – and because of – those that lead to the second wave: 
First, both popular culture and personal experience gave young women the 
notion that contemporary feminism was unnecessary because equality had 
been achieved. They grew up knowing about feminism and benefiting from 
its gains… Many third-wave writers talk about how their feminist mothers or 
fathers gave them the sense of entitlement that made them feel feminist 
struggle might no longer be necessary… 
 
A second predominant message of the time was that feminism had gone too 
far and, in fact, was to blame for the exhaustion of women trying to do 
double duty as career women and wives and mothers. Media stereotypes of 
the hairy-legged, bra-burning, anti-male, strident feminist permeated the 
culture. This led to the phenomenon of “I’m not a feminist, but…” syndrome, 
beginning in the late ’80s, in which young women refused to identify 
themselves as “feminist” even though they agreed with feminist political 
views…  
 
The third stone in the bedrock of third-wave feminism is that, contrary to 
being unnecessary or having gone too far, the movement had not gone far 
enough, limiting itself to the narrow interests of its white, liberal majority. 
(ibid.:  188) 
 
The second is of particular note, as it reminds the reader that there exists a shame 
within feminist circles of those ridiculous archetypes not unlike the gay 
embarrassment of the queer leather/sadomasochist subcultures and promiscuous 
and/or effeminate gays.  However, the third reason, that feminism had not gone far 
enough, suggests the continued potential for coalitional politics and the recognition 
and celebration of multiplicity, a politics that can and should include transmen and 
transwomen. 
 
The Feministing website (www.feministing.com) was created in 2004 to 
give young feminists a presence on the internet and to discuss issues that affect 
their own lives and futures.  According to their media and press kit, the website 
receives more online traffic than the websites for Ms, Bitch, and Bust magazines, 
the Feminist Majority Foundation, and NOW, presumably making it one of the 
most influential places on the World Wide Web for young and emerging feminists.  
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Blogs can be published by users and can be collected under key words, such as 
Transgender Issues, War, and Television, amongst others.  For example, one can 
click on Transgender Issues and access the archive of transgender-related posts and 
their responses, with each having multiple keywords themselves, based on the 
content of the blog entry. 
   
On the website, user vexing published a blog entry called Feminists who 
attack trans women, offering her opinion on the position in which some woman-
born feminists place transwomen. 
However, I've come to the conclusion that this particular brand of feminist 
attacks trans women specifically because they are easy targets, emotionally 
and psychologically. They lack the gumption to attack cis males, so instead 
they focus their energy on trans women - as though we're some kind of 
magical 'back door' into the Patriarchal Complex. 
 
Unfortunately, were not. We have been thoroughly disowned by the 
patriarchy, as something disgusting, false, vile and traitorous. Ask any 
garden gnome misogynist and he'll tell you that trans women deserve to be 
shot or drowned - and he'll do just that if one ever touches him. 
 
But despite this, trans women are supporting the patriarchy, according to 
these radical feminists. 
 
How? Well, but embracing a gender stereotype, of course. Everyone knows 
that all trans women embrace everything stereotypically 'girly' and 'femme' - 
things which re-enforce gender conditioning and damage women and 
feminism as a whole. (Feministing.com, 2010) 
 
 
 
 The first thing one will notice is that the community blogs are less about 
seeking advice, as in transgender, but rather they are more like critical essays, 
the attitude of the site represented by its logo – the affectionately referred to 
“mudflap girl,” giving the reader her middle finger (next page).  In fact, the first 
blog read as part of this research used the kind of terminology and phrases that hold 
academic capital: performativity, normativity, misreading, and even a Judith Butler  
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reference (Feministing.com, 2009e), potentially 
illustrating a Dugganian marriage of liberalism-
based activism and critical theory.   
 
 Any Feministing user can post a blog 
and all users have access to comment upon 
them.  Unlike transgender, one segregated 
community of thousands of communities 
available on LiveJournal.com, Feministing’s transgender-related posts are 
published as they come in, interspersed with non-transgender-related blogs; 
transgender posts may be sandwiched between unrelated posts and articles.  This 
leaves Feministing’s transgender community’s blogs open to the audience of the 
entire site and thus gives a sense that transgender occupies a borrowed space on a 
feminist site.  While there were only a few cisgender user comments in 
transgender, the proportion of cisgender users commenting on Feministing’s 
transgender-rated blogs is much higher.  Thus the audience for vexing’s criticism 
of transphobic feminists is not largely transgender, as it would be in transgender, 
but cisgender, including those very transphobic feminists that she criticises.  This 
chapter is concerned with how Feministing’s transgender community negotiates a 
sense of community in “borrowed,” and heavily-cisgender, virtual space on a 
feminist website. 
 
Transphobia and Feminism 
In 1979 Janice Raymond, in her text The Transsexual Empire: The Making of 
the She-Male, made the bold statement that “all transsexuals rape women’s bodies by 
Image 2: Feministing.com’s 
mudflap girl logo. 
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reducing the real female form to an artefact, appropriating this body for themselves” 
(1979: 104).  Feminine transwomen were singled out for their celebration of 
femininity and “oppressive” beauty practices and their invasion of “women’s 
spaces” (Green, 2006). Feminists that support the woman-born woman mandate 
often argue that transwomen have benefitted from patriarchy and male privilege 
before transitioning and that they have not felt of full experience of femaleness and 
female embodiment.  The “particular brand of feminist” to which vexing refers sees 
transwomen as mocking femininity and perpetuating patriarchal female stereotypes, 
while transmen are often disowned for giving up on the fight and seeking patriarchal 
privilege instead.  Controversial women-born women-only events and spaces, such 
as the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival and the Vancouver Rape Relief and 
Women’s Shelter, have sparked transgender activism and arguments that woman-
born woman policies are transphobic exercises in cisgender privilege.   
 
 In Beauty and Misogyny: Harmful Cultural Practices in the West radical 
feminist Sheila Jeffreys attempts to position transgender issues within the beauty 
practices of women.  To her, the feminist project and transgender/queer project differ 
on “what is to be done with gender after the revolution,” as radical feminists want to 
abolish gender while queer theorists “are all interested in milking the performance of 
gendered behaviour for its sadomasochistic excitements” (Jeffreys, 2005: 65-66).  
She suggests that genderqueer political projects are based on a simplistic reading of 
Judith Butler’s work that regards performativity as merely performance, that gender 
play and cross-dressing is the revolution itself.  Her knowledge claim on transpeople 
and queer theorists assumes all queer political projects rely on binary sex/gender and 
refuses to recognise the vastness of genderqueer projects that include, for example, 
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gender duality and androgyny.  Further to this, her theory of transgender is 
exclusively transvestic and absolutely fetishistic.    
Behind the choice of femininity on the part of men lies in their fascination 
with playing the subordinate role of “woman” for the sexual satisfactions of 
masochism that this offers… Transvestism, transsexualism and 
transgenderism can be seen as being sexual practices rather than making 
those reared as “men” into “women.” (ibid.: 49) 
 
Transwomen thus support the patriarchy, as vexing’s feminist enemies claim, 
through their insistence on abusing gender for its sexual worth and thus maintaining 
the oppression that results from binary gender.  Throughout her discussion of 
transfemininity, Jeffreys continues to conflate all female transgender (transsexual, 
transvestite, and genderqueer) subjectivities and reduces them all to perverse 
fetishism.  While there is rich psychiatric literature on transvestism and 
“pathologies” of fetishism, many transgender subjects are not likely to define their 
gender strictly through their sexual practices and its occasional few minutes of 
sexual pleasure (though Valentine’s work suggests this is possible for some).  One 
wonders how Jeffreys would define an asexual transwoman, as certainly that 
particular articulation of gender/sex/sexuality would exist. 
 
 Scholars like Raymond and Jeffreys treat femininity, whether innate or 
symbolic, as a commodity that belongs to female-bodiedness which can be traded for 
privilege.  The idea that transmen can trade their femininity for male privilege, for 
example, ignores the very real conditions that transmen often face: loss of 
employment, family, and friends, violence, etc.  Judith Butler argues that these 
feminists do not consider gender as historically constructed and the “attribution of 
femininity to female bodies... takes place within a normative framework in which the 
assignment of femininity to femaleness is one mechanism for the production of 
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gender itself” (2004, 10).  In other words, they are (re)constituting gender as they are 
abolishing it. 
 
Activist, scholar, and transman Pat Califia suggests the problem of trans 
inclusion is much more problematic because it call into question the notion of 
“woman” and radical feminist politics.   
Nothing upsets the underpinnings of feminist fundamentalism more than the 
existence of transsexuals. A being with male chromosomes, a female 
appearance, a feminist consciousness, and a lesbian identity explodes all of 
their assumptions about the villainy of men. And someone with female 
chromosomes who lives as a man strikes at the heart of the notion that all 
women are sisters, potential feminists, natural allies against the 
aforementioned villainy. (Califia, in Green, 2006) 
 
Additionally, as third world women and women of colour have critiqued second 
wave feminism as to how some feminisms cannot work for them, transwomen, and 
to a less recognised degree transmen, are in a uncertain position of having to argue 
how feminism can work for them whilst still being feminism, a strategy of engaging 
feminism despite the transphobia of some feminisms.  Again, we must keep in mind 
that at one historical moment lesbian feminism was excluded from some feminism, 
as well. 
 
Transfeminism 
 Judith Butler suggests that the New Gender Politics that have emerged in the 
recent two decades is based on advances in transgender, transsexual, and intersex 
theorising and the complex relationships they each hold with queer and feminist 
theories.  For her, there is no narrative to illustrate the epistemological shifts from 
feminism to queer theory, and on to trans theory because “none of these stories are 
the past; these stories are continuing to happen in simultaneous and overlapping 
ways as we tell them” (2004: 4).  In The Transfeminist Manifesto, activist Emi 
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Koyama describes a notion of transfeminism that she wants available to all people: 
feminists, queers, transpeople, and cis- allies.  Transfeminism is not about “taking 
over existing feminisms,” but extending feminism and coalition politics to 
transpeople, standing up for the oppression of all (types of) women and asking “non-
trans women to stand up for trans women in return” (2001: 3).  To this end, Koyama 
finds the question of male privilege crucial to transfeminism.   
When confronted with such an argument, a natural initial response of trans 
women is to deny ever having any male privilege whatsoever in their lives. It 
is easy to see how they would come to believe that being born male was 
more of a burden than a privilege: many of them despised having male 
bodies and being treated as boys as they grew up…  
 
However, as transfeminists, we must resist such a simplistic reaction. While 
it is true that male privilege affects some men far more than others, it is hard 
to imagine that trans women born as males never benefited from it. Most 
trans women have "passed" as men (albeit as "sissy" ones) at least some 
point in their lives, and were thus given preferable treatments in education 
and employment, for example, whether or not they enjoyed being perceived 
as men… 
 
What is happening here is that we often confuse the oppression we have 
experienced for being gender-deviant with the absence of the male privilege. 
Instead of claiming that we have never benefited from male supremacy, we 
need to assert that our experiences represent a dynamic interaction between 
male privilege and the disadvantage of being trans. (ibid.: 5) 
 
Thus, male privilege must be recognised to establish coalition politics for 
transfeminists. The accusation should not be met with denial, but rather seen as a 
new space of theorising, just as white feminists have had to address their own 
privilege.  And like feminists, transfeminists must address the oppressions of body 
issues, violence, and medicine. This could be one way of opening discussion and 
possibilities with anti-trans feminists.   
 
 Koyama also recognises that the ontological separateness of sexuality and 
gender is socially constructed and historically specific and that the distinction 
between the two is “artificially drawn as a matter of convenience” and transfeminists 
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must resist any essentialising notions within wrong body discourses (ibid.: 6). To be 
in the wrong body privileges ontologies of sexual difference that can be used against 
all women, as it reifies sexual difference. 
 
Engage and Enrage 
Occupying space on a feminist site means confronting feminisms that may 
actively exclude transpeople, as well as (re)shaping those feminisms that are 
ignorant of or unconcerned with transgender concerns.  In this way, Koyama’s 
project of transfeminism may be developed and deployed.  Given transgender’s 
relative hiddenness on LiveJournal, as well as its demographics, one might 
question if it actually engages the public; perhaps, despite a few already invested 
cisgender members, it is a digital closet.  This would not be the case on 
Feministing, which is overwhelmingly cisgender. What is more, the internet allows 
for “a more systematic form of self-selection” that allows users to avoid certain 
issues (Nah et al., 2006: 233).  Those engaged or enraged by the issues in the 
Transgender Issues section of Feministing elect to read and comment on the blogs. 
 
Nettle Syrup published Transwoman to be transferred to women’s prison to 
notify members of a case in the United Kingdom where a transwoman in prison was 
being transferred to a women’s prison (2009a).  Activism for transgender rights in 
prison has a long history with the LGBT coalition, including continued activism from 
American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) National Prison Project, Transgender Law 
and Policy Institute, Transgender Law Center, and the Transgender, Gender Variant 
and Intersex (TGI) Justice Project, amongst others.  The main concerns for 
transgendered inmates include safety and health. Whilst recognising the arguments 
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against medical models of transsexuality, Law scholar Alvin Lee suggests that "when 
trying to secure trans-specific health care for inmates, trans advocates are specifically 
requesting medical care" (2008: 468, emphasis in original).  Furthermore, 
“demedicalization of gender identity would have disruptive short-term consequences 
for these ethical obligations” in inmates. (ibid., 470). 
 
Most disturbing is the legacy of transgender prison rape that has long been 
ignored.  In 2002, Kelly McAllister, a pre-operative transsexual who lived as a 
woman for several years, was placed in a cell with a male that violently raped her.  In 
her case against Sacramento County, California she claimed the sheriff was aware of 
her transgender status but still placed her in the cell.  This longstanding practice of 
placing prisoners in prison based on their genitalia has resulted in many rapes and 
deaths and in cases involving transsexual people, the court determines whether the 
person is a genuine transsexual, which is made even more difficult since “many 
transsexual people spend a significant period of time in transition” and may not fit 
neatly into limited categories at the time of trial (Peek, 2004: 1217).  The first federal 
recognition of transgender prison rights in the United States was in 2001, though 
most federal prisons do not have a formal policy (ibid.).  Transwomen or effeminate 
men in men’s prisons can only choose “to act submissive or be beaten into 
submission” within rigid sociosexual prison hierarchies (ibid.: 1229).  
 
The case mentioned in Nettle Syrup’s blog involved a transwoman convicted 
of manslaughter and attempted rape.  Having spent most of her incarceration in a 
vulnerable inmates wing of a men’s prison, she was now being moved to a female 
prison.  The prisoner in question had begun transitioning prior to his arrest and had 
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breast implants whilst in prison. This victory for human rights was quickly countered 
with: 
SomeCommenter:  This is taking ‘human rights’ too far…  This is 
sickening. 
I don’t think the guy should have been moved. If he 
is really trans he’s waited however long, he can wait 
until he is released to get treatment, but I just don’t 
think he is. 
What about the women prisoner’s rights? (2009a) 
 
The obvious note is SomeCommenter’s comment demonstrates that transwomen are 
still – and possibly will always be – men.  Moreover, her increased risk for rape, 
murder, and other victimisation in a men’s prison is left unacknowledged.  How dare 
“his” human rights be considered, despite that fact that woman-born women that 
attack other women are placed in women’s prisons. 
 
One blog opened discussion of an article in Seventeen, a magazine marketed 
to teenaged females, called “My Boyfriend Turned out to Be a Girl.”  It involved a 
young woman who met and fell in love with a man, with whom she was not intimate 
as he wanted to take things slow.  Her boyfriend left for university, met another girl, 
and returned to the protagonist’s house to pick up his belongings.  In the ensuing 
argument, the police was called and the officers outed her boyfriend as “really a 
woman.”  The discussion led to the notions around the disclosure of trans status and 
intimacy, with some cisgender users claiming it is essentially rape to not disclose 
one’s trans status. 
KBZ: Obtaining consent under false pretenses is not 
consent. If someone consents with the understanding 
that they are consenting to sex with a ciswoman, and 
their significant other is hiding their transgendered 
status … that isn’t consent. 
You simply do not have the right to withhold 
information that would be fundamental to your 
partner’s decision as to whether to consent to sex. 
Fundamentally, my argument is as follows … 
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If I don’t know, I can’t consent. If I can’t consent, 
you can’t have sex with me. Thus, if I don’t know … 
you can’t (ethically) have sex with me. It is as 
simple as that. 
I don’t have a right to know anything about you, and 
you don’t have the right to have sex with me until I 
can give informed consent. If you don’t want to tell 
me … that’s your business. You must choose 
between telling me and having sex with me, or not 
telling me and not having sex with me. The choice 
remains yours as to whether to come out or not. 
 
ElanaFulana: It is never the job of a transgender person to cater to 
their partners transphobia. 
Lets take you’re argument to its logical conclusion, 
shall we? 
If I don’t want to have sex with blonds, and a blond 
with dyed hair has sex with me, by your argument 
they’ve raped me. 
If I don’t want to have sex with anyone who has had 
surgery, and someone who had surgery to correct a 
facial deformity has sex with me, by your argument 
they’ve raped me… 
 It’s not rape, I’m not entitled to know that 
information, and my prejudice is not their 
responsibility. 
The idea that you need to know private information 
about a person such as their race, medical history, or 
transgender status, in order to consent to sex with 
them, is a product of your prejudice and bigotry. 
That’s your problem, not theirs. 
No one has the obligation to cater to your prejudice. 
  
j7sue2: KBZ- you’re transphobic comments indicate that 
you just don’t get it. 
Personally I’m bisexual, so I don’t really get the 
hang ups some people have about having sex with 
someone with the wrong shape body. It’s the person 
that matters, surely? 
 
KBZ: Your heterophobic/homophobic comment shows 
you just don’t get it. Heterosexuality and 
homosexuality are not “hang-ups” … they are sexual 
orientations and they are just as valid as your 
bisexual orientation. The gender of a sexual partner 
does matter to some people. Heterosexuals and 
homosexuals have the right to their sexual identities, 
and they have the right not to have those identities 
exploited by a transgendered individual that is not 
being forthright. (Feministing.com, 2009g) 
 
The arguments about sexual orientation, illustrated by KBZ, was echoed by other 
cisgender community members, that heterosexual women deserve to know if the 
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penis of their seemingly male partner is “genuine” or constructed.  Other members 
attempted to remind them that post-operative males are physically male and post-
operative females are physically female; the problem lies in the insistence that post-
operative transpeople are still their initial biological sex.  This argument was 
probably best countered by Sarah B: 
Sarah B: The argument in this thread which keeps recurring 
despite its obvious transphobia seems to be basically 
that “no trans people allowed” is a sexual 
orientation. No. Sorry. Stop for a second and think 
about that one. (2009j)  
 
For KBZ, a postoperative male needs to inform her that he was once a female, or he 
has raped her because he is a woman that coerced her into an act that she, 
presumably, would not perform with a woman.   
 
Feeling the magazine blog entry had been hijacked by the issues/accusations 
of rape, ElanaFulana began a new blog criticising the claims of transpeople having to 
come out before intimacy, called Coming out as Transgender to Romantic Partners 
(2009h).  In it she states 
ElanaFulana: When a trans man transitions he isn’t being 
deceptive – just the opposite. He is being himself, 
despite everything he was socialized to believe about 
who he is. 
If he uses medical interventions, it’s not to deceive 
people, or even to “become” a man. He’s always 
been a man. The purpose is to bring his body into 
congruence with who he really is. It’s his 
unmodified body that had been the deception (ibid.).   
 
The debate continued: 
 
Icy Bear: I am all for informed consent, but I think people 
describing this as an issue of informed consent is 
rather ridiculous, because generally people have no 
right or reason to assume a person’s anatomy based 
on their gender. If we have a tendency to assume 
that all women have vaginas and all men have 
penises, it’s our duty to STOP ASSUMING THAT, 
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not our partner’s obligation to tell us if they don’t 
happen to fit into our assumptions. 
 
xoros: You want trans people to be upfront? In an ideal 
world everyone ought to be. In an ideal world people 
would /know/ the gender binary and its concepts of 
sex and gender are rubbish. But it isn’t ideal. And 
that is not our fault and neither is the onus on us to 
personally educate everyone all the time. 
So people wait until a few dates in, maybe a few 
months even to mention it, then you have issues of 
fear of rejection, fear of being called a liar, all of the 
things you all have been discussing. And yes, people 
have made some valid points. But those points take 
no account of the trans person in your scenarios as a 
feeling, fearing emotional being who is way, way 
more likely to be rejected and even physically hurt 
/just for being trans/. Do you really wonder why 
trans people don’t want to own up on the first date? 
The second, third? Anyway why should we? Oh yes, 
otherwise we are lying… 
 So here we get to the meat of it. Liars. Am I lying 
when I pass as cis? Or only when someone else 
thinks I am cis and wants to fuck me? I haven’t told 
them I am cis, they have assumed it. I haven’t told 
them if it is ok to be attracted to me, they have 
assumed it. Why is that the trans person’s fault? We 
have not created the assumption. 
 
ffyona: I think an issue like this – until we learn, as a group, 
to change how we view gender – is going to be a 
minefield of privilege and mis-understanding.  I 
appreciate you taking the time to explain a trans 
perspective. 
[Your comment on assumption] needs to be read 
over and over again. How the assumption is dealt 
with is going to be different for every couple, but 
acknowledging that the assumption is a result of a 
cis, heteronormative binary rather than a deception 
on the trans person’s part is crucially important. 
(ibid.) 
 
Claiming a space on a website or in an online community that does not deal with 
exclusively transgender issues leaves these community members vulnerable of 
transphobia.  One cisgender member, April, even argued that trans users “demand 
that cis people figure out [the term cis-] on their own” (2009j, emphasis in original).  
When confronting feminists, who by nature would intimately aware of oppression 
and oppressive structures that are often taken for granted, is this difficult, how does 
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one even consider confronting the mainstream?  Those enraged by transgender-
related blogs have a history of making their prejudices known and this much is 
evident in comments in various threads: 
 
xoros:  Feministing is not very transfriendly unfortunately.  
Many trans people are still boycotting it.  I myself 
refrain from commenting unless I really, really feel 
moved to. (2009h) 
 
timberwraith:  As a trans person who has read this blog for years, 
I’ll second what xoros said. Feministing is 
generally unfriendly territory for trans folks. The 
main posts are usually thoughtful and well written, 
but the comment threads are often disastrous. 
(ibid.) 
 
gudbuytjane:  I think the only things I am going to ask potential 
hookups from now on is: 
1. Are you cis*? 
2. Are you a regular reader of Feministing? 
Cuz, really, the violence in the words folks have for 
trans women here are as good an indicator as any 
that they’re a potential threat. (2009l) 
 
 
Educating Feminists? 
The ability to engage in debate with a larger community means that real 
change can happen.  In addition to ffyona, SociologicalMe, another cisgender user, 
added, 
SociologicalMe: That made plenty of sense, and was all very well 
said. Thank you for your perspective. I can’t imagine 
how frustrating it must be to have one’s own truth be 
called a lie, and of course if that’s what going on the 
“you’re a liar” meme would be a hardcore trigger for 
trans people. I’m gonna go contemplate what equal 
responsibility for disclosure would look like if we 
actually had it in society. (2009h) 
 
They were not alone: 
 
Gular:  I think that this topic has challenged a lot of 
unexamined privilege of my own and it’s really been 
an eye opener. I have a lot of work to do because 
theoretical me is like “the cis person just needs to 
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accept!” but the realistic part of me is “the trans 
person may be a big help in this”. (2009k) 
 
However, requests for information were criticised as privilege. 
 
xoros: There are places and times to ask questions about 
wider or more basic info. It isn’t in the middle of a 
discussion about a specific topic. What happens is 
that people /constantly/ require us as minority to 
start over with the basics /every single time/. We 
never get to move on to discuss the details, the 
consequences, the issues of our lives and the 
problems we face – and how people can be good 
allies. And instead of talking about the issues we 
end up having a discussion about this very thing. 
It’s derailling. 
You insisting that you have a right to have the 
basic information served up to you on a plate, on 
demand, by a minority is imposing your privilege. 
The privilege of not needing to know these things. 
Of not having your life negatively affected by 
these things. It is not our responsibility to educate 
you about trans 101 things in the middle of a 
thread that does not have that as its purpose. (ibid.) 
 
It is true that in most blog entries, cisgender users would often request additional 
information and recognised their own ignorance on trans issues.  The frustration this 
caused for some users is demonstrated above, not unlike some of transgender’s 
users.  In fact, the original discussion in Transphobia in Seventeen… Wait Not So 
Much (Feministing.com, 2009g) was derailed by accusations of transpeople deceiving 
partners, which led to ElanaFulana posting the new blog Coming Out as Transgender 
to Romantic Partners (Feministing.com, 2009h)  five days later to focus on where 
discussions from the previous blog led to, which led to ElanaFulana posting the new 
blog Having Sex While Stealth is Not Assault (Feministing.com, 2009j) five days 
after that, to silver_unicorn resteering discussion to Being Transgender is Dishonest 
(Feministing.com, 2009k) three days after that.  KBZ, the cisgender female that 
insisted indisclosure of trans status is rape remarked,  
KBZ: The never ending debate continues with thread #4 (I 
think… maybe its 5).  Holy moly.  My position 
remains unchanged, but I’ve grown tired of the 
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back-and forth.  It seems to have devolved into 
accusatory bickering at this point.  Agree to 
disagree, I suppose.  Live and let live. 
 
alixiana: If you’ve grown tired of it, I imagine it’s because 
you have the luxury to do so. 
 
rootedwillow: It’s not the responsibility of EVERY person in a 
minority group to educate the majority but how do 
you expect change from the majority if you refuse 
to inform them? In fact how you expect the 
majority to be interested enough to go get 
educated about these issues if they don’t 
see/hear/experience these issues. 
There are a lot of people on this site who take an 
elitist attitude about “what you should already 
know” about feminism, LGBTQQIA issues and so 
forth. If you were never exposed to those issues 
how the hell are you supposed to know about 
them? And if only “those who are informed” are 
supposed to hang out on this site then it’s just 
preaching to the choir…that wont change 
anything. 
Then there is no point in activism. 
 
Gular: Activism is demanding rights and actions based on 
the experiences that set you apart from the 
majority. Activism is an extension of the day-to-
day, but I don’t believe that I, as a gay man, 
should have to tell you about the entirety of my 
experiences as a gay man just because you want to 
know. 
I can certainly demand protections and be an 
activist for that, but it doesn’t obligate me to 
educate you about everything it means to be gay in 
my experience. 
What you need to know from activism is the exact 
information you’re being told. From there you can 
inquire as to the need for action and inquire, but to 
ask or demand people to educate you about 
themselves isn’t the core of activism. 
 
That is not to say the presence of transgender concerns on Feministing does not 
facilitate education on trans issues and concerns.  Various posts had comments of 
cisgender people acknowledging their own lack of knowledge and how appreciative 
they were to learn about their own oppressive structures: 
Gular:  I think that this topic has challenged a lot of 
unexamined privilege of my own and it’s really 
been an eye opener. I have a lot of work to do 
because theoretical me is like “the cis person just 
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needs to accept!” but the realistic part of me is 
“the trans person may be a big help in this”. 
(2009k) 
 
dirty democrat:  Thank you for this post. I’m embarrassed to say 
that even as a long-time feminist activist, gay 
rights supporter, and all-around progressive, I 
myself only even learned what the term 
“cisgender” MEANT a year ago. I and others in 
the cisgender group of people have a lot to learn 
about transgender folks and issues, and I 
appreciated this opportunity to learn.  (ibid.) 
 
b: Thank you very much for posting this. I think it’s 
really important to speak up about these issues in a 
forum that fosters debate and highlights the issue 
rather than simply replying to a transphobic 
comment. You are incredibly articulate and 
insightful and I appreciate all the work you are 
doing in exposing intolerance within the feminist 
community. (2009l) 
 
saresailis: Thank you. 
I didn’t realize that I had some transphobia to 
unpack, and reading your piece has helped me take 
a step in the right direction to being a better ally 
and better person. 
Please keep writing, educating, and working to 
make this a better community. (ibid.)  
 
 
 
The Other’s Other? 
 Violent transphobia and being read as trans, Butler contends in Undoing 
Gender, must be understood as a response to correct any deviance and re-establish a 
dichotomous gender structure.  What remained missing was how these structures 
impact intersexed people, whose existence was noted only three times and in passing 
comments (2009f, 2009h, 2009m). Intersexuality, being born with both male and 
female internal organs and/or external genitalia, also destabilises the notion of 
woman-born woman – and man-born man, for that matter – by illustrating a sexual 
binary is not entirely natural and stable.  However while intersex and transsexual 
subjects are occasionally classified together under the rubric of transgender, there 
has been some debate as to how related they are, if at all. 
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The argument for classifying transsexualism as a kind of intersex condition 
is evidence that at birth an individual’s sexual identity is fixed in the brain.  
In other words at birth the individual’s brain and genitals are not congruent 
and this is as much an intersex condition as a person whose gonads and 
genitals are not congruent. (Chau and Herring, 2002: 333). 
 
On the surface, it would seem to make sense that those assigned the wrong gender 
and those in the wrong body would make for obvious bedfellows. However, while 
transsexuality is often based on wrong body discourses, much contemporary intersex 
theory and activism questions the classification of a body into only two distinct 
categories, something that is often the project of normative transsexuality.  Intersex 
theories would criticise transsexuals for reifying a binary sexual system.  Thus the 
sociopolitical agendas of transsexuals and intersexed individuals may compete, 
further marginalising them each from the heterosexual and gay/lesbian mainstreams.  
Opinions in medical interventions divide transsexuality and intersexuality: the former 
advocating for corrective, elective procedures, the latter rejecting the imposition of 
such procedures.  So it is not surprising to see the following sarcastic comment 
because the ontologies of transgender and intersex are so separate: 
Borea:  I REALLY like how this article basically ignores 
Intersex people.  Nope!  They don’t exist! (2009m) 
 
 Intersexuality demonstrates what intersexed cultural theorist Iain Morland 
(2001: 528) calls “an excess of sexual difference – perhaps a vagina and penis – 
rather than a lack of differentiation,” with medical management programmes 
designed to “create sexual difference out of intersexed flesh” (ibid.: 529).  Medical 
models demonstrate four types of somatic sexual difference: genetic sex, gonadic 
sex, brain sex, and genital sex.  Genitals, to Morland, are the most problematic to 
medicine because misdeveloped intersex cells threaten a binary sexual difference, a 
bodyscape that may not match the body’s true sex.  Further to this, gonadic sex is 
almost as problematic, as a child could be born with a mixture of gonadic tissue 
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(ovotestes) or one ovary and one testis.  Genetic sexing is not an exact science, 
either, as a child could be XY (a normal male), XX (a normal female), or a number 
of genetic “abnormalities” (for example, XXY, XYY, XXX, and XO karyotypes, 
cellular mosaics such as 45XO/46XY, and gene translocations on non-sex 
chromosomes). 
 
 Despite this, medical discourse reifies sexual difference through its own 
terminology, an effect not dissimilar to medical discourses of transsexuality.  The 
majority of intersexuals are classified as pseudohermaphrodites, as they may display 
ambiguous or dual genitalia, but their gonads suggest what was meant to be a wholly 
male or wholly female body.  These intersexuals are described as male 
pseudohermaphrodites or female pseudohermaphrodites, suggesting that their 
confusing bodyscape is simply masking a real, true sex and the language of 
pseudohermaphroditism means that “intersexuality remains only a pseudo-threat to 
maleness and femaleness,” as it names and neutralises the threat of inbetweeness 
(ibid.: 536).   
 
 Medical discourse and intervention seeks to, in Butlerian language, reiterate 
sexual difference in intersex newborns; through assignment and surgical 
“correction,” sex is produced through a discursive repetition of sexual difference that 
is taken to be natural and dichotomous.  Intersexed bodies demonstrate that sexual 
difference is not static, but needs to be (re)produced.  This begs the question, Are 
some women-born women born truly women themselves?  At what point should 
women with a large clitoris or who have had some dead, excess testicular tissue 
removed after birth be excluded? 
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In a joint article, biochemist P-L Chau and medical law scholar Jonathan 
Herring (2002) briefly discuss the history of intersexuality.  They describe that 
during the Renaissance and Middle Ages an intersexed person was allowed to choose 
their sex upon entering adulthood, but once made their decision could not be 
reversed.  By the beginning of the 20th Century, medical technology and knowledge 
had advanced far enough that doctors were left to examine the individual and 
determine the true sex of the patient.  This later shifted to the doctor determining the 
best sex of the patient, a medical approach largely influenced by psychologist John 
Money, whose claim was based on one case study of one patient, “Joan/John,” that 
was not even intersexed at all. 
 
“John” had been born a male, but his penis was severed during what was 
supposed to be a routine circumcision.  Money advised the parents to raise the boy as 
a girl and further surgery was performed to further feminise “John” into “Joan.”  The 
girl, Money argued, would successfully live as a woman as long as she had been 
raised as a female and is not informed of her history because gender identity is a 
product of socialisation, though she would need hormone replacement therapy and 
follow up care.  Though the case did not involve an actual intersexed child, Money 
used the case study as a recommendation for how to treat intersexed children.  Sex 
assignment surgery should be performed as quickly after birth as possible and, when 
possible, parents should not be told of their child’s intersex condition so as to raise 
the child appropriate to its assigned gender.  Instead, surgery should be described to 
parents as “completing” unfinished organ development.   
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 Despite Money’s assurance in writings that “Joan” was a happy, feminine girl 
she never truly identified as a girl and suffered depression.  Clinically depressed at 
fourteen years of age, her parents confided in her regarding her birth, failed 
circumcision, and subsequent sex reassignment and she decided to live as male.  
Money never published anything to indicate the experiment ultimately failed.   
 
 In 1997, David “Joan/John” Reimer published his story.  Between “Joan’s” 
outing, research on intersexed people that did not have surgery, and research into 
intersexed people’s complaints regarding their own surgeries, Chau and Herring note 
that doctors in the UK are increasingly taking a “wait and see” approach to treatment. 
 
 John/Joan was used for framing various debates about the social construction 
of gender, especially as it pertains to intersexuality and transsexuality – is gender 
learned?  Is it biological?  Can relearning be successful?  However, I wish to remind 
the reader that David was neither intersexed nor transsexual. 
 
The medical criterion of sex assignment was based on genital size, a sort of 
“too small now, too small later” approach: a penis was feminised if smaller than 2cm 
at birth, as too small a penis – or too large a clitoris – would affect a person’s self 
esteem in heterosexual practices later in life.  The emphasis, Chau and Herring argue, 
was not based on fertility or future sexual satisfaction.  For example, Cheryl Chase, 
founder of the Intersex Society of North America, notes 
From my birth until the surgery, while I was Charlie, my parents and 
doctors considered my penis to be monstrously small, as well as lacking a 
urethra… Then, once the intersex specialist physicians had announced that 
my “true sex” was female, my clitoris was suddenly monstrously large, all 
without changing size. (as quoted in Morland, 2001: 539) 
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Cheryl’s resulting clitorodectomy to reassign her body to its “true” form with a more 
aesthetic clitoris left her incapable of orgasm (ibid.).  In support of Chase, Riki 
Wilchins described Chase and her ordeal to a women’s organisation: 
To help board members of the women's organization to understand, I 
showed them how to make a diagnosis.  Holding up a thumb and forefinger 
about a quarter inch apart, I said, "female."  Moving them about three-
eighths of an inch apart, I said "intersex."  I repeated the finger movement 
from "female" to "intersexed" over and over until heads began to nod. 
 
Since many intersex infants are "really" women, this made [intersex genital 
mutilation] a women's issue. (Wichins, 2004: 80) 
 
Further to this, Wichins describes intersex genital mutilation (IGM) to gay and 
lesbian groups: 
Some doctors perform IGM out of an antique fear that girls with large clits 
(which no man likes) will repel potential husbands (which every woman 
needs), interfere with penetration (which every woman enjoys), and increase 
their chance of growing up to be masculinized lesbian women (which 
practically no woman wants to be).  IGM was no longer an intersex issue or 
even a women's issue; it had become a gay issue. (ibid.: 81) 
 
After bringing IGM to transgender groups, who also bargained that IGM is a 
transgender issue, Wilchins laments about the lack of political activism from IGM’s 
new allies; Women were not outside hospitals protesting against infant 
clitorodectomies and gays and lesbians were not protesting against using hormones 
and surgeries to erase potential future queerness, because “an arbitrary definition 
means that these infants aren't female or possibly lesbian or even transgender.  
They're this other thing called intersex” (ibid.: 82).  The intersexed are just another 
letter to be added to the LGBT coalition, to be used when politically necessary, but 
ignored when too politically problematic. 
 
 Indeed, while intersex and transsexual subjects are occasionally classified 
together under the rubric of transgender, there has been some debate as to how 
related they are, if at all. 
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The argument for classifying transsexualism as a kind of intersex condition 
is evidence that at birth an individual’s sexual identity is fixed in the brain.  
In other words at birth the individual’s brain and genitals are not congruent 
and this is as much an intersex condition as a person whose gonads and 
genitals are not congruent. (Chau and Herring, 2002: 333). 
 
On the surface, it would seem to make sense that those assigned the wrong gender 
and those in the wrong body would make for obvious bedfellows. However, while 
transsexuality is often based on wrong body discourses, much contemporary intersex 
theory and activism questions the classification of a body into only two distinct 
categories.  Intersex theories would criticise transsexuals for reifying a binary sexual 
system.  Thus the sociopolitical agendas of transsexuals and intersexed individuals 
may compete, further marginalising them each from the heterosexual and gay/lesbian 
mainstreams.  Opinions in medical interventions divide transsexuality and 
intersexuality: the former advocating for corrective, elective procedures, the latter 
rejecting the imposition of such procedures. 
 
(Re)Thinking Transnormativity 
 
Accusation and prejudice on what should be thought of as a “virtual safe 
space” plays its part in the perpetuation of transnormativity.  In transgender, users 
could take advantage of an overwhelmingly trans space to discuss hormone 
replacement therapies, coming out, and how best to pass, among other normative 
concerns.  This does not exist on Feministing.  As davenj explained it, “On 
Feministing the one group that’s required to explain itself and its issues is trans” 
(2009h).  Community-building is a luxury for interlopers, even online.  Threads 
regularly resorted to trans users confronting transphobia and insisting on having a 
place on the site, as transpeople and feminists. 
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In her blog titled Facsimile of a Woman (2009b), vexing laments on her trans 
status and that she’ll never be treated like a real woman.  She describes the inability 
to go “stealth” without major sacrifices that include family and friends and needing 
to “regularly stick a series of graduated plastic dildo up [herself] to keep [her] 
surgically created vagina from closing up and making [her] a new kind of freak.” 
vexing: It’s the pain of still having dreams in which you are 
male, despite years of living as a woman. 
 
It’s the unconscious betrayal of your biology against 
your gender identity. 
 
And there’s precious little I can do about any of this. 
 
Still, even being a passable facsimile of a woman is 
better than living an even faker existence as a 
completely miserable man, on the brink of insanity. 
(ibid.) 
 
She is then naïvely counselled by a cisgender user to embrace her transsexuality, to 
which she responds, “I don’t want to embrace, celebrate or own being 
transgendered…  It’s not something to be proud of. The goal is to be treated like any 
other woman, not differentiate yourself from other women” (ibid.) Further, the 
reimagining of her subjectivity as a third gender is not sufficient: “it’s not acceptable 
for people like me who want to be treated as strictly ‘Female’.”  This is in stark 
contrast to ejgs402, for example, who states, “…I try to explain that, yes, I’m all 
woman, dick included” (2009h). 
 
  While trans users of Feministing tended to represent themselves through 
essentialist biomedical models, this, I argue, is less about one’s understanding of 
one’s body and mind than about legitimating one’s subjectivity when confronted 
with users that undermine that very experience.  The evocation of transnormative 
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articulations acts differently within borrowed space and I wish to elaborate on and 
problematise the critical understanding of transnormativity from Chapter Four. 
 
 Queer geographer Natalie Oswin attempts to undermine the queer critique 
of complicity and the presumed radical character of queerness.  She argues that at 
the core of these critiques is the stereotype of the affluent gay white male, a 
phantasm of commodification and idealism that is not a member of an existing, 
living group.  When describing stereotypes, Oswin evokes Edward Said’s concept of 
Orientalism insofar that “one ought never to assume that [its] structure is nothing 
more than a structure of lies and myths which, were the truth to be told, would 
simply blow away” (quoted in Oswin, 2005, 82). Critical queer theories suggest the 
“fiction that he is always and indeed the only figure embroiled in a complicit 
relationship” while queer Others exist “outside spaces of complicity, and therefore 
harkened to as the source of a rejuvenated queer republics” (ibid.: 83).  Instead, we 
must see the complicit gay(/lesbian) as appropriating opposition of dominant 
representations through normativity-producing structures of commodification: the 
gay cowboy is still a queer parody/resignification of heteromasculinity. 
 
 Thus, while homo-/transnormativity dequeers the subject for his or her 
embrace of normative structures, the process is not – cannot be – complete.  The 
monogamous, married, suburban gay man at his neighbourhood’s PTA meeting is 
still a gay man at a PTA meeting.  Even the best passing postoperative transwoman 
shatters rigid gender assumptions should she disclose her male past.  That queer 
politics can only exist outside of complicity/normativity is troubling for Oswin 
because 
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complicit queerness can still present a threat.  But it is not the threat we 
thought it was, we may have to look harder and in different, unforeseen 
places to detect it, and we may not always like what we find. (ibid.: 82) 
 
For example, the importance of passing and going “stealth” is illustrated in 
vexing’s next blog, in which she describes the reactions of people to Facsimile of a 
Woman: 
vexing:  Here’s a few gems from the waterfall of bullshit that 
poured into my inbox: 
 
"You look like an average gay boy who decided a 
play dressup, dude 
You’re just mad you’re not passing enough…  " 
 
"Transwoman? You sound more like a dude jacked 
up on testosterone injections… you have to lay off 
those steroids. 
I could say a lot more wat I really think about yer 
looks.. but don’t want to hurt you too bad…" 
 
"You’re trying to be bitchy… but still you come off 
as ‘cocky’." 
 
I wish I could just brush this all off, but one of the 
things about being trans is, well, being horribly 
insecure about how you look. So of course, while 
making brave replies which looked all the world like 
I was calm and in control, I sobbed my fucking heart 
out and cursed ever posting on Feministing on the 
first place and inviting this torrent of shit into my 
rather fragile world. (2009c) 
 
The brutality of anonymous responses to vexing’s email address demonstrates why 
passing is so privileged.  For Butler, transphobia seeks “to renew the social world on 
the basis of intelligible gender, and to refuse the challenge to rethink that world as 
something other than natural or necessary” (2004: 34).  To reduce transnormativity 
to a conservative transsexual v. queer transgender paradigm simply ignores the 
critique of sexual dimorphism within various transsexual movements and the 
livability of real transpeople.   
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Transsexual activist Kate Bornstein rejects gender dimorphism and invokes 
transsexuality as a gender politics of transformation and her Gender Outlaw: Of 
Men, Women, and the Rest of Us is a call to reject a binary system of gender.  She 
remarks, “I live pretty much without a gender, which paradoxically means I can do 
many genders” (1995: 135).  It is a politics of playful becoming, rather that that of 
what one has been or what one aspires to be.  Rather than create a phantom past, 
Bornstein states, “I need my male past as a reference point in my life.  Discouraged 
from examining our past, transgendered people are discouraged by growth” (ibid., 
127).  In this way Bornstein describes the recognition of maleness that is later 
articulated in Koyama’s manifesto.  We must, however, be cautious of idealising – 
itself a kind of normalisation of –  this kind of queer gender play at the expense of 
other, perhaps more mainstream, articulations of queering gender. 
 
The livability of one’s life as a transsexual, however normative, however self-
theorised, is one to be respected, even if one’s agency and subjectivity as a 
transsexual is a condition of hegemonic discourses.  For vexing, detransitioning, 
becoming a man again, is “worse than a death sentence” (2009b).  Considering the 
disproportionate rates of depression and suicide amongst transpeople (Wyss, 2004), 
this cannot be taken as mere hyperbole.  In fact, despite all of her theorising, 
Bornstein comments 
There’s a reward and punishment mechanism to passing. As much as I go on 
about this stuff, and as out of the closet as I am on a very broad public level, 
I still make an effort to walk down the street and pass on a very private level. 
I do this because I don’t want to get beaten up. I do this because all my life 
it’s been something I’ve wanted. (ibid.: 125, emphasis mine) 
 
Passing, then, is not simply a means to avoid violence, but it plays a crucial role, 
psychically.  It is the pain, as vexing explains it, of having dreams wherein she’s still 
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male.  It is the pain that arises in KBZ’s implicit statement that ElanaFulana will 
always be male and sex whilst masquerading as a female is rape.  It is the pain of the 
accusation that xoros is a liar for passing.  It is the pain of some feminists excluding 
you because you’re not really a woman or not woman enough.  And, quite frankly, it 
is the pain of a critical theorist telling you that you pass too well to really be queer, if 
that happens to be the way you identify. 
  
 Critiques of normatively certainly have their place and merits; it is vital for 
coalition politics to recognise colonising forces amongst its members.  It is vital, too, 
for the sake of LGBT politicking, that bisexuals, transgendered people, intersexed 
people, butch dykes, flaming faggots, queer Christians, s/m practitioners, sex 
economists, queer people of colour, HIV+ people (the list goes on) feel their dissent, 
needs, and experiences are not ignored by those normal-identified gays and lesbians 
that are often the smiling faces of our movements.  
 
 Borrowed space on Feministing shows that cyberspace is not easily the 
utopian ideal of communication and activism.  Though it is online and physical 
violence is significantly reduced, we see psychical violence from those we hoped to 
be our sociopolitical kin.  Whether one uses normative approaches to experiencing 
their body or not, all transgendered people contest the ideals of what bodies should 
be like (Butler, 2004) and perhaps this politicking is substantial in and of itself.  Just 
as homonormativity has its critiques, some of its politics, for example gay marriage, 
provides social and legal change that upholds equality, even if one’s queer politics 
rejects that option for marriage oneself.  Likewise, the ability to present as in 
between (as opposed it an opposite pole) is locally and socially contingent; one may 
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be able to safely genderfuck in, say, an underground New York City punk scene, 
whilst opting to not pass as any gender in Oklahoma may result in death at the hands 
of homo- and transphobia. 
 
 122 
6  
CONCLUSION  
 
 
This research originally began as an intention to explore the ways in which 
transgender people can use the internet as a “queer space” wherein they can 
articulate their own subjectivities.  However, a preliminary reading of                       
transgender suggested the story is much more intricate and complex. While 
discussions supported my view of virtual space as a space of queer belonging and 
community-building when denied public space for one’s gender expression, the 
issues of respectability and politic-claims not dissimilar to homonormative 
gay/lesbian politics began to emerge.  
 
The first recognisable trend was the often-quoted narrative of the “true 
personality” at odds with bodily betrayal.  Transsexual people often cite a 
biological etiology of transsexuality that is preclusive of simple gender “choice”; 
they are (wholly) women or men, and separately gay, lesbian, or bisexual, but in 
the wrong body.  A whole diverse literature of medical sciences even suggests that 
the body can be changed to suit the psyche – and with an amazingly low “regret 
ratio” of less than 1 per cent (Michel, et al., 2002).  The cultural privilege of these 
medical discourses means they become hegemonic and develop the very terms and 
vocabulary of transsexual articulations.  These discourses are then reified by 
various transsexual narratives that rely on those vocabularies for their own 
formation.  This is in opposition of the transgender subject that is idealised in 
Queer Theory for its fluidity and desire to playfully pick and choose from hir 
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allusions with a sociopolitical ambivalence to the corporeality of the body.  I would 
like to note that the members of transgender that identified as bigender or 
nongender received no crimination of their identities, but the overwhelming 
majority of the community was transsexuals with an idealisation of passing 
biotechnologies, such as hormone replacement therapies, and an aversion to radical 
queer theorising that questioned their own identity formation and knowledge 
claims. 
 
In Chapter One, I introduced the nature of this project: the ways in which a 
marginalised community within a marginalised community can make claims to 
knowledge and space, as well as situating gender queerness as a (homo)sexuality 
issue.  It was suggested that feminist and queer theories are one way to look at the 
nature of the paradigm and transgender subjects may search out alternative spaces, 
such as the internet, for community formation. 
 
Chapter Two described the production of transgender (specifically 
transsexuality) and sexualities within medical knowledges and discourses and how 
the Foucauldian notion of the internalised gaze allows subjects to self-police their 
gender performance.  To demonstrate the discrimination and limited political 
resources of transgender people, the New Zealand transgender experience was 
discussed.  It was then demonstrated that this discrimination is perpetuated not only 
by heteropatriarchal structures, but from conservative gay and lesbian “allies” 
ashamed of gender deviance and its problematics to respectable, liberal rights 
claims.   
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In Chapter Three I discussed both my own queer epistemological approach 
and my own ontology of being within the “queer community.”  I justified the use of 
feminist and queer perspectives to expose the heterosexual and cisgender natures of 
knowledge claims.  I describe the use of oral histories and the new ways of 
meaning that can produce and describe the use of internet posts as written, 
conversational oral histories. 
 
Chapter Four’s discussion of transgender on LiveJournal.com described 
the various themes of discussion during a one-week period.  Active discussion 
centred around linguistic reclamation of perjoratives (tranny), psychiatric and 
somatic issues, including diagnosis and hormone therapy, consciousness-raising, 
successful passing, and the anger and disillusionment faced when feeling let down 
by the larger LGBT community.  The community described in Chapter 5 consisted 
of a larger cisgender demographic and the discussions were strikingly different and 
defensive; in borrowed virtual space, like public space, there is a need to validate 
one’s subjectivity.  And while this can been done with minimal physical harm, 
there is still potential for emotional violence in the “utopia” that is cyberspace. 
 
Wilchins’ suggestion of the gender closet (Chapter 2) is a way, I believe, to 
strengthen activism from gay-lesbian dominated “LG (and B and T) politics” to a 
broader LGBT/queer community.  If a discourse of the gender closet can be 
established within gay and lesbian ontologies and our own gender shame 
addressed, we can fully appreciate the transgender subject and how important we 
both are to a politics of queer dissent.  I do not mean to suggest a superficial 
engagement with gender (Diet Tranny: Same great discrimination, fewer 
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hormones!), but to actually engage theory on the intersectionality of our own 
sexuality and gender(s) analogous to the transgender intersectionality of gender 
and sexuality(s); to appreciate – and use politically, effectively – the transgender 
subject’s coming out as a gendered and sexual being, we need to come out not only 
as gay/lesbian, but (trans)gendered as well, as fairies, faggots, and butch dykes, as 
well as the preferred gender normative masculine gay and feminine lesbian.  
Coming out of the gender closet allows us to regain the importance of gender and 
gender play to our politics of dissent – and reaffirm our political commitments to 
our transgender kin. 
 
However, this project has also raised several questions for future research.  
The methodological limitation of the project was that the analysis was based on one 
community over one week.  While this resulted in almost five hundred individual 
posts to analyse, the period may not have been long enough to capture the greater 
nuances of the community and notice the emerging relationships of users. 
 
It is the LiveJournal users’ ability to interact with other transpeople whilst 
disembodied and anonymous that has the potential for them to express their real 
and idealised selves.  But that their gender variance and personhood is 
communicated in an anonymous means suggests that to a certain extent, trans 
issues remain invisible.  For example, few people may know LiveJournal exists and 
even fewer may know transgender exists, or have the vested interests as a 
LiveJournal user to actively search for the site and engage in discussion.  It is in 
this way that transwebs may not have the opportunity to engage the larger public 
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and to make known the oppressions these anonymous people face on a regular 
basis.  transgender may be its own digital closet. 
 
Other researches may be elaborated by performing a cross-community 
analysis, for example looking at posts on transsurgery versus posts on               
genderqueer to further analyse or refute the conclusions of this particular project, 
or to look to niche communities such as  transangst or tranny_rage to analyse 
the consciousness-raising potential of the online communities hosted on 
LiveJournal. 
 
Further to this, future researches may wish to employ interviews with users 
to determine the ways online communication transformed offline selves.  For 
example, while the post regarding the candlelight vigil for Tyli’a Mack in 
Washington DC indicated one user was going to attend, was this user aware of the 
vigil before the post on LiveJournal?  Was this user the only community member to 
attend?  And if a user in Washington DC opted not to attend, why? 
 
 While this project has framed its position to the sciences as sceptical, I 
would tentatively support sociologist Riki Lane (2009: 137) in her call to “get past 
binaries of gender in general and trans in particular, such as essentialism versus 
constructionism and subversive versus conservative gender identities” and to 
develop a new conceptual framework to replace dichotomies and upon which new 
theories of all gendered articulations can emerge that recognise that biological 
determinism and social construction alone may not be adequate to describe bodies 
and gendered subjectivities. 
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